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I. INTRODUCTION 
Amidst now common reports of global heating, glacier melt, 
sea level rise, ocean acidification, species extinction, persistent 
droughts, and other consequences of human greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, the 2015 United Nations Conference on 
Climate Change brought unprecedented international media 
attention to the planet’s climate crisis. Although the resulting 
accord ultimately fell short of presenting an adequate and 
substantive response, the Conference of Parties held in Paris 
(COP21) underscored the urgency at hand.1 Scientists have 
been predicting staggering damage to our lives and 
environment from climate change for some time.2 A recent 
report of the U.S. Global Climate Change Research Program 
says unequivocally: “Climate change, once considered an issue 
for a distant future, has moved firmly into the present. . . . 
Precipitation patterns are changing, sea level is rising, the 
oceans are becoming more acidic, and the frequency and 
                                               
1. For a declaration of climate urgency by scientists, see Brief for Scientists as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants Seeking Reversal at 15–16, Alec L. ex rel. 
Loorz v. McCarthy, No. 13–5192, 2014 WL 3013301 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2014) 
[hereinafter Brief for Scientists], http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/
Filed‌ScienceAmicus.pdf (“Effective action remains possible, but delay in undertaking 
sharp reductions in emissions will undermine any realistic chance of preserving a 
habitable climate system, which is needed by future generations no less than by prior 
generations.”). 
2. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, OVERVIEW: CLIMATE CHANGE 
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S. NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 4 (2014), http://
nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/overview/overview. 
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intensity of some extreme weather events are increasing.”3 The 
year 2015 closed as the hottest year on record.4 The failure of 
international climate negotiations to adequately address 
climate disruption presents an unsettling backdrop for the 
ever-increasing clarion calls from the scientific community 
urging robust, decisive action. As Dr. James Hansen, former 
Director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 
stated: “[F]ailure to act with all deliberate speed in the face of 
the clear scientific evidence of the danger functionally becomes 
a decision to eliminate the option of preserving a habitable 
climate system.”5 
This Article spotlights a recent Washington case, Foster v. 
Washington Department of Ecology, which breaks new judicial 
ground in forcing governments to control dangerous GHG 
emissions. The case is part of an urgent global litigation 
campaign known as Atmospheric Trust Litigation (ATL). The 
Article begins by summarizing the actions deemed necessary 
by scientists to avert climate catastrophe, and describes the 
ATL campaign that formed in response. Part II explains the 
public trust framework, which provides the legal foundation for 
this climate litigation. Part III examines the three stages of 
atmospheric trust cases and describes the litigation up until 
the Foster decision. Finally, Part IV analyzes the Foster 
decision for its path-breaking role and potential effect on the 
ATL climate campaign as a whole. 
                                               
3. Id. See also Brief for Scientists, supra note 1, at 15–16 (“Amici Scientists warn of 
climate change impacts including . . . floods, storms, fires, and droughts.”); KOKO 
WARNER ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SHELTER: MAPPING THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
ON HUMAN MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT iv, 2 (2009), http://ciesin.columbia.edu/
documents/ClimMigr-rpt-june09.pdf (discussing the effects of climate change on 
human migration globally). 
4. See Dwayne Brown & Michael Cabbage, NASA, NOAA Analyses Reveal Record-
Shattering Global Warm Temperatures in 2015, NASA (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.
nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-noaa-analyses-reveal-record-shattering-global-warm-
temperatures-in-2015. Earth has already warmed about 0.8ºC over the past century. 
James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of 
Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations, and Nature, 8 PLOS 
ONE e81648, 4 (2013) [hereinafter Climate Prescription], http://www.plosone.org/
article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.
0081648&representation=PDF. 
5. Brief for Dr. James Hansen as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7, 
Alec L. v. Jackson, No. C–11–2203 EMC, 2011 WL 8583134 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2011) 
[hereinafter Hansen, Amici Curiae Brief], https://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/
files/Hansen%20Amicus%20.pdf. 
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A. Climate Crisis and the Scientific Prescription to Restore 
Balance 
Carbon dioxide pollution not only disrupts the planet’s 
climate system but also imperils the world’s oceans. The 
oceans operate as natural carbon “sinks” absorbing carbon 
dioxide (CO2). This absorption causes a series of chemical 
reactions in marine water and results in ocean acidification.6 
In fact, since the Industrial Revolution, about one-third of 
human carbon emissions have been absorbed by the oceans, 
and unsurprisingly, the oceans are now thirty percent more 
acidic.7 Ocean acidification threatens biodiversity, fisheries, 
and aquaculture, undermines the food security of millions of 
people, and jeopardizes tourism and other sea-related 
economies.8 
Atmospheric energy imbalances also warm the oceans. In 
the annual 2014 State of the Climate Report, United States’ 
government scientists reported record warming on the surface 
and upper levels of the oceans, with the Pacific Ocean 
registering four to five degrees Fahrenheit above normal.9 The 
oceans absorb more than ninety percent of man-made heat 
energy driving global warming. The rate of heat absorption has 
doubled since 1997.10 To put the matter into staggering 
perspective, half of the approximately 300ZJ11 of total heat 
energy absorbed by the planet since 1865 is attributable to the 
                                               
6. For a discussion of the ocean’s acidification process, see A Primer on pH, NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://pmel.noaa.gov/co2/story/A+primer+on+pH 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2016). See also What is Ocean Acidification?, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/acidification.html (last visited 
May 12, 2016). 
7. See What is Ocean Acidification?, supra note 6 (percent increase in ocean acidity). 
8. See The Ocean Portal Team, Ocean Acidification, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM 
NAT. HISTORY, http://ocean.si.edu/ocean-acidification (last visited May 12, 2016). 
9. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Warming of Oceans Due to Climate Change is 
Unstoppable, Say US Scientists, THE GUARDIAN (July 16, 2015), http://www.
theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/16/warming-of-oceans-due-to-climate-change-
is-unstoppable-say-us-scientists. 
10. See Seth Borenstein, The Amount of Man-Made Heat Energy Absorbed by the 
Seas has Doubled Since 1997, a Study Released Monday Showed, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-01-19/
study-man-made-heat-put-in-oceans-has-doubled-since-1997. 
11. One zettajoule (ZJ) is the equivalent of one billion terajoules (TJ) or 278 billion 
megawatt hours (Mwh). 
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last eighteen years.12 Associated Press reporter Seth 
Borenstein makes this analogy: in the last eighteen years 
alone, “Earth’s oceans have absorbed man-made heat energy 
equivalent to a Hiroshima-style bomb being exploded every 
second for seventy-five straight years.”13 
This marine warming brings devastating consequences for 
coral reefs, the oceans’ “rainforests.”14 In 2015, half of the 
corals in the Caribbean Sea died after warming waters sparked 
a massive bleaching event, and U.S. scientists predict that the 
warm temperatures of 2016 will cause an additional six-
percent loss of coral reefs worldwide in that year alone.15 A 
survey conducted in early 2016 of Australia’s Great Barrier 
Reef reinforces the U.S. scientists’ predictions, finding that 
ninety-three percent of Australia’s reefs are already bleached, 
with the northern reefs suffering nearly fifty percent coral 
death.16 
More recently, scientists have discovered significant oxygen 
depletion as a result of this heating.17 Overall, with each 
degree increase in ocean temperature, the oxygen 
concentration in the water decreases by two percent.18 
Additionally, higher water temperatures decrease the rate of 
ocean circulation, causing stratification where the oxygen-rich 
upper layers mix less with the oxygen-depleted deeper layers.19 
Over the past ten years, oxygen levels in the deep waters off 
the southern coast of California have decreased by twenty 
                                               
12. See Borenstein, supra note 10. By comparison, two ZJ is the equivalent of 
detonating an atomic bomb (the size dropped on Hiroshima) every single second for a 
full year. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. See Karl Mathiesen, 15,000 sq. km of Coral Reef Could be Lost in Current Mass 




16. See Chris Mooney, ‘And Then We Wept’: Scientists Say 93 Percent of the Great 
Barrier Reef Now Bleached, WASH. POST (April 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/04/20/and-then-we-wept-scientists-say-93-
percent-of-the-great-barrier-reef-now-bleached/?tid=hybrid_experimentrandom_1_na. 
17. See Niina Heikkenen, Ocean’s Oxygen Running Low, ‘Sobering’ Study Finds, 
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percent.20 While higher temperatures slow the rate of ocean 
circulation, the warmer waters also boost the metabolism of 
marine life, increasing their need for oxygen, and thereby 
further exacerbating the devastating effects of the warming 
ocean on marine ecology.21 
Because humans today are both increasing carbon emissions 
into the atmosphere and also destroying the planet’s natural 
carbon sinks, the forests and oceans, the Earth’s climate 
system has lurched into a perilous imbalance.22 The dual, 
worsening crises of climate disruption and dying oceans cannot 
find relief without slashing greenhouse gas emissions across 
the globe. Though considerable climate harm is irrevocably 
underway, many leading scientists say it is still possible to 
restore climate equilibrium over the long term. Such an effort 
requires reducing atmospheric carbon dioxide levels to 350 
parts per million (ppm), the uppermost level to limit total 
average planetary heating to a safe zone of one degree 
Celsius.23 In 2010, recognizing the need to quantify—for 
policymakers, judges, and citizens—the emissions reduction 
necessary to stay within the safe zone, NASA’s chief climate 
scientist, Dr. James Hansen, convened an international team 
of scientists to create a climate prescription for the planet.24 
The resulting prescription addresses both carbon emissions 
and the planet’s natural carbon absorption mechanisms, as 
they are inextricably linked. The first part of the climate 
prescription calls for a dramatic slash of carbon emissions well 
beyond those targeted at COP21. The prescription presents a 
                                               
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. See The Ocean Portal Team, supra note 8. 
23. See Climate Prescription, supra note 4, at 13. In defining such a zone, the team 
aimed for carbon levels present during the Holocene period in which human 
civilization developed. See id. at 8 (“Warming of 1ºC relative to 1880–1920 keeps global 
temperature close to the Holocene range, but warming of 2ºC, to at least the Eemian 
level, could cause major dislocations for civilization.”); id. at 5 (discussing 350 target); 
id. at 10 (“keeping global climate close to the Holocene range requires a long-term 
atmospheric CO2 level of about 350 ppm or less”). Other research institutions refer to a 
1.5ºC trajectory as the most cautionary path that remains technically feasible. See 
PAUL BAER ET AL., STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST., THREE SALIENT GLOBAL MITIGATION 
PATHWAYS ASSESSED IN LIGHT OF THE IPCC CARBON BUDGETS (2013), http://sei-us.org/
Publications_PDF/SEI-DB-2013-Climate-risk-emission-reduction-pathways.pdf 
(comparing the risks associated with a 1.5ºC increase, a 2.0ºC increase, and the 
increase outlined at the G8 conference of 2009). 
24. See Climate Prescription, supra note 4. 
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trajectory, or “glidepath,” of annual emissions reduction 
towards an ultimate goal of near-zero emissions.25 The team 
stated that global emissions reduction of six percent annually, 
beginning in year 2013, was required to reach 350 ppm by the 
end of the century.26 Delaying reduction in carbon emissions 
sharply increases the level of necessary yearly reductions—to a 
point at which the reductions ultimately become too steep to 
plausibly salvage a habitable planet.27 For example, the 
Hansen team estimated that, had concerted action started in 
2005, emissions reduction of just 3.5% a year could have 
restored equilibrium by the end of the century, yet in just eight 
years of inaction, that figure climbed to six percent a year.28 
The scientists project that, if emissions reduction is delayed 
until 2020, society would need to reduce emissions by fifteen 
percent a year.29 At some point, the necessary cuts become too 
drastic for global society to accomplish. As the Hansen team 
emphasized: “[I]t is urgent that large, long-term emissions 
reductions begin soon.”30 
Moreover, it is important to understand that reducing 
emissions alone is not adequate to restore climate equilibrium. 
Because approximately forty percent of emissions persist in the 
atmosphere for over a thousand years at present removal 
rates, any planetary atmospheric rescue effort must also focus 
on removing much of the carbon dioxide that has already 
                                               
25. Id. at 9. But see PAUL BAER ET AL., supra note 23, at 3 (noting reductions of 6% 
per year only have a 50% chance of holding the global warming under 2ºC, while more 
aggressive reductions, 9% per year, increase the chance of staying under 2ºC to 66%). 
The BEAR ET. AL. assessment does not account for the drawdown of CO2 contemplated 
in the Climate Prescription. See, Climate Prescription, infra note 32, and 
accompanying text. 
26. See Climate Prescription, supra note 4, at 10. 
27. See PAUL BAER ET AL., supra note 23, at 1 (“The 1.5°C marker pathway is defined 
as the most challenging mitigation pathway that can still be defended as being techno-
economically achievable.”). 
28. Climate Prescription, supra note 4, at 18. 
29. Id. at 10 (“These results emphasize the urgency of initiating emissions reduction. 
As discussed above, keeping global climate close to the Holocene range requires a long-
term atmospheric CO2 level of about 350 ppm or less, with other climate forcing similar 
to today’s levels. If emissions reduction had begun in 2005, reduction at 3.5%/year 
would have achieved 350 ppm at 2100. Now the requirement is at least 6%/year. Delay 
of emissions reductions until 2020 requires a reduction rate of 15%/year to achieve 350 
ppm in 2100.”). 
30. Id. 
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accumulated in the atmosphere.31 Accordingly, the second part 
of the scientific climate prescription addresses the “drawdown” 
of carbon dioxide through massive reforestation (because trees 
naturally absorb carbon dioxide) and improved agricultural 
measures (because soil also absorbs carbon dioxide). The 
Hansen team calculated that a full-scale massive restoration 
program consisting of reforestation and soil measures can draw 
down about 100 gigatons of carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere, an amount key to restoring atmospheric carbon 
levels to 350 ppm.32 
The global challenge of CO2 emissions reduction finds 
unprecedented urgency due to nature’s own “tipping points”—
thresholds beyond which dangerous feedback processes are 
triggered. Such feedbacks can unleash uncontrollable, 
irreversible, “runaway” heating capable of destroying the 
balance of the planet’s climate system.33 Such tipping points 
form the crux of the scientific community’s call for urgent 
action. Recognizing this danger, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated in one climate case: “Several studies also show 
that climate change may be non-linear, meaning that there are 
positive feedback mechanisms that may push global warming 
past a dangerous threshold (the ‘tipping point’).”34 Once fully 
                                               
31. See William Moomaw, From Failure to Success: Reframing the Climate Treaty, 
THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.fletcherforum.
org/2014/02/10/moomaw/. Only by restoring the Earth’s natural ability to remove 
carbon can overall atmospheric levels drop. As Professor William Moomaw explained, 
“We must not only turn off the faucet that is filling the atmosphere with heat trapping 
gases, but we must also unclog the drain that is removing them.” Id. 
32. Climate Prescription, supra note 4, at 10 (“[I]t is not impossible to return CO2 to 
350 ppm this century. Reforestation and increase of soil carbon can help draw down 
atmospheric CO2.”). If the drawdown from reforestation is less, the amount of carbon 
emissions reduction necessary to achieve 350 ppm increases substantially. Id. While 
the team admits that the forest and soil storage of 100 GT is ambitious, they point out 
that the strategy includes beneficial externalities, including increased resilience to 
climate change, improved productivity in agriculture, and further protection of 
ecosystem function. Id. 
33. See generally FRED PEARCE, WITH SPEED AND VIOLENCE: WHY SCIENTISTS FEAR 
TIPPING POINTS IN CLIMATE CHANGE xxiv–vi (2007) (describing “unstoppable planetary 
forces” beyond tipping points and the end of climatic stability); Leslie McCarthy, 
Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Research Finds that Earth’s Climate is 
Approaching ‘Dangerous’ Point, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/news/
topstory/2007/danger_point.html (May 30, 2007) (discussing thresholds of global 
temperatures and atmospheric carbon dioxide that trigger dangerous interference with 
the climate system). 
34. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 
508, 523 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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triggered, these feedback loops continue despite any 
subsequent carbon reductions achieved by humanity.35 
Though the precise threshold of atmospheric CO2 that 
represents the point-of-no-return is unknown,36 the global 
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has surpassed 400 
ppm.37 Already, some dangerous feedback loops are manifestly 
in motion. Vast areas of melting permafrost now release huge 
amounts of CO2 and methane (both of which are greenhouse 
gasses) into the atmosphere,38 and melting polar ice caps 
intensify the heating, because less ice remains to reflect heat 
away from Earth—a dynamic known as the albedo effect.39 Gus 
Speth, the former Dean of the Yale School of Forestry, warns 
that if we maintain our largely inadequate course of action, the 
world “won’t be fit to live in” by mid-century.40 
B. Atmospheric Trust Litigation: The Planet on the Docket 
With such feedback loops looming, a rapid and decisive 
response to the planet’s atmospheric crisis is paramount to 
overcoming an existential threat to global civilization. As an 
indicator of the growing international recognition of climate 
danger, the recent COP21 talks in Paris produced an accord 
aiming to limit planetary heating to 1.5ºC.41 Despite this 
                                               
35. Scientists warn that continued carbon pollution will trigger feedback loops that 
would lead to irreversible, uncontrollable global warming. See Nafeez Ahmed, James 
Hansen: Fossil Fuel Addiction Could Trigger Runaway Global Warming, THE 
GUARDIAN: EARTH INSIGHT (July 10, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/
earth-insight/2013/jul/10/james-hansen-fossil-fuels-runaway-global-warming. 
36. Id. See also Bill McKibben, The Tipping Point, YALE ENV’T 360 (June 3, 2008), 
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_tipping_point/2012/ (discussing the changing scientific 
consensus about the tipping point as it has been adjusted from 550 parts per million to 
350 parts per million since the mid-1990s). 
37. See Adam Vaughn, Global Carbon Dioxide Levels Break 400ppm Milestone, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 6, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/06/
global-carbon-dioxide-levels-break-400ppm-milestone. 
38. See Nafeez Ahmed, Seven Facts You Need to Know About the Arctic Methane 
Timebomb, THE GUARDIAN: EARTH INSIGHT (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.
com/environment/earth-insight/2013/aug/05/7-facts-need-to-know-arctic-methane-time-
bomb. 
39. See James Hansen et al., Climate Change and Trace Gases, 365 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 1925, 1935 (2007) (“A climate forcing that ‘flips’ the 
albedo of a sufficient portion of an ice sheet can spark a cataclysm.”). 
40. JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, 
THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILITY x (2008). 
41. For more details about the agreement, see UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON 
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aspirational goal, the actual plans submitted by the 
participating countries would result in only half of the required 
greenhouse gas reductions necessary to limit the increase to 
just two degrees Celsius.42 Thus, while the remedy for the 
climate change crisis increasingly becomes more difficult and 
more expensive, not only in terms of monetary cost but in 
societal and cultural upheaval as well, the Paris accord 
continued the pattern of inadequate international action.43 
Indeed, the failure of the Paris talks demonstrates that 
domestic processes must provide the imperative for carbon 
reduction. As Johannes Urpelainen of Columbia University 
summarized, “[i]n the end, the future of climate mitigation 
remains in the hands of national governments, political 
parties, interest groups, [and] sub-national jurisdictions.”44 
On the domestic level, the judiciary represents the third 
branch of government, and a latecomer to the crisis that has 
worsened in the hands of the legislative and executive 
branches. Only recently have citizens asserted through 
lawsuits their fundamental rights as a basis for climate action. 
Most notably, the global campaign known as Atmospheric 
Trust Litigation (ATL) was launched in 2011 to provide a legal 
structure geared toward forcing urgent emissions reduction 
around the world.45 ATL’s approach recognizes that, while 
                                               
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/more-details-about-the-agreement/ 
(last visited May 31, 2016). 
42. See id. See also Bill McKibben, World Leaders Adopt 1.5 C Goal – and We’re 
Damn Well Going to Hold Them to It, GRIST (Dec. 12, 2015), http://grist.org/climate-
energy/world-leaders-adopt-1-5-c-goal-and-were-damn-well-going-to-hold-them-to-it/; 
Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-change-
accord-paris.html. 
43. See Davenport, supra note 42. 
44. See Johannes Urpelainen, What Political Science Can Tell Us About the Paris 
Climate Deal, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/14/heres-what-political-science-can-tell-us-about-the-paris-
climate-deal/. Michael Levi, an expert on energy and climate change policy at the 
Council on Foreign Relations, summarized the agreement: “Whether or not this 
becomes a true turning point for the world, though, depends critically on how seriously 
countries follow through.” Davenport, supra note 42 (quoting Levi). 
45. See Gabriel Nelson, Young Activists Sue U.S., States Over Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/05/
05greenwire-young-activists-sue-us-states-over-greenhouse-64366.html; Matthew 
Brown, Climate Activists Target States With Lawsuits; Atmosphere As a ‘Public 
Trust’, CNSNEWS.COM (May 4, 2011), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/climate-
activists-target-states-lawsuits-atmosphere-public-trust. The ATL approach was 
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there is no panacea to a climate negotiation stalemate, 
domestic courts have the power to order the political branches 
to take swift and decisive action responsive to the climate 
crisis. 
In the first week of May 2011, young people organized by the 
non-profit Our Children’s Trust initiated legal processes in 
every state in the U.S. and began plans for suits in other 
countries as well.46 The original legal “hatch” consisted of 
lawsuits and administrative petitions filed against all fifty 
states and the federal government.47 The campaign 
represented an unprecedented effort at forcing a coherent 
approach to a global problem using the judicial system. 
All of the legal processes invoked the public trust doctrine 
and declared a uniform sovereign trust duty to protect the 
atmosphere needed by the youth and future generations for 
their long-term survival. The petitions and lawsuits all 
demanded enforceable Climate Recovery Plans from 
government trustees to reduce carbon emissions at the rate 
called for by the scientific prescription formulated by the 
Hansen team of scientists (or best available science).48 These 
plans would be backed up by annual carbon accountings to 
show compliance with the prescription. More than a dozen 
renowned scientists and experts submitted declarations in 
                                               
described in Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in ADJUDICATING 
CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES (William C. G. 
Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). See also Mary Christina 
Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation Around the World, in FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE 
ATMOSPHERIC TRUST (Ken Coghill et al. eds. 2012), https://law.uoregon.edu/images/
uploads/entries/ATL-Across-the-World.pdf. 
46. For a comprehensive set of ATL updates and materials, consult the website of 
Our Children’s Trust at http://ourchildrenstrust.org. 
47. See Youth Sue the Government to Preserve the Future and Halt Climate Change, 
OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/iMatter_Legal_
Release_11.05.01.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016). 
48. The initial prescription was developed by the team for the litigation and 
disseminated in May, 2011. See MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE 221 (2013) (explaining the Hansen 
team climate prescription that calls for an annual 6% reduction in carbon emissions 
and the extraction of 100 gigatons of CO2 from the atmosphere through reforestation 
and improved agricultural practices). The 6% figure was tied to a start year of 2013. 
Because such reduction did not occur, the figure has increased steadily. See supra note 
29 and accompanying text. The necessary annual global CO2 reduction as of 2016 is, 
according to Dr. Hansen, 8%. See Inslee Administration Defies Court Order, Betrays 
Children, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, June 1, 2016, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/
default/files/2016.06.01CleanAirRulePR.pdf. 
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support of the litigation, and a nationwide group of law 
professors submitted amicus briefs supporting the youth 
plaintiffs in key ATL cases. 
Unlike prior climate litigation brought under statutory law 
or nuisance law suits geared towards isolated parts of the 
climate problem, ATL presented for the first time a macro 
approach to climate crisis by focusing on the atmosphere as a 
single public trust asset in its entirety. The approach 
characterizes all nations on Earth as sovereign co-trustees of 
the atmosphere, bound together in a property-based 
framework of corollary and mutual responsibilities. As 
trustees, all nations owe a primary fiduciary obligation toward 
their citizen beneficiaries to restore the atmospheric energy 
balance and climate system. 
ATL seeks to accomplish through decentralized domestic 
litigation, in countries across the globe, what has thus far 
eluded the international diplomatic treaty-making process: 
concrete requirements for emissions reduction. Rising out of 
this failure of international law, ATL’s unconventional effort 
recognizes the need for a legal lever to force agencies and 
legislatures to respond to the climate emergency.49 ATL 
litigation teams hope that orchestrated lawsuits worldwide will 
yield atmospheric trust decrees that will spur the political 
branches to protect common atmospheric property before 
tipping points send the world into unmitigated disaster.50 As 
one commentator put it, “[w]ith both the executive and 
legislative branches having been stymied on any major 
climate-change progress for more than two decades, the 
[litigation] represents a kind of Hail Mary pass, trusting that 
                                               
49. See Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation Around the World, supra note 45. 
50. The approach has been criticized by some scholars who maintain that the 
political branches should solve the climate problem. See, e.g., Richard Lazarus, 
Judicial Missteps, Legislative Dysfunction, and the Public Trust Doctrine: Can Two 
Wrongs Make It Right?, 45 ENVTL. L. REV. 1139 (2015). The same scholars, however, 
note that Congress has been abdicating its role in making environmental legislation. 
See, e.g., id. at 1149. Congress is unlikely to act, given that 182 members do not believe 
that climate disruption is even real. See Katie Herzog, Surprise! A Third of Congress 
Members Are Climate Change Deniers, GRIST.ORG (Mar. 8, 2016), http://grist.org/
climate-energy/surprise-a-third-of-congress-members-are-climate-change-deniers/. 
Moreover, the criticism seemingly arises from a misunderstanding of the requested 
remedy. The role of the court is not to perform the job of the other branches, but rather 
to force the other branches to perform their trust functions. Courts are not asked to 
develop Climate Recovery Plans themselves. 
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courts might bring about a speedier solution.”51 
As expected in the initial stages, environmental agencies 
denied the petitions for rulemaking in nearly every state. 
Appeals were filed in only a few select state courts. Of those 
appeals, only two states have explicitly declined to extend the 
public trust doctrine to the atmosphere, though courts have 
dismissed several cases on procedural grounds.52 Recently, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered the State 
Department of Environmental Protection to “promulgate 
regulations that address multiple sources or categories of 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions, impose a limit on 
emissions,” and “set limits that decline on an annual basis.”53 
Meanwhile, cases in Colorado, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
and Oregon are ongoing, and several more key cases will soon 
be filed. On the international stage, Our Children’s Trust has 
partnered with attorneys to file cases in Uganda, Ukraine, and 
Pakistan, and the organization is working with attorneys on 
citizen actions in the Netherlands, India, Canada, France, 
England, Norway, and Belgium.54 
In September, 2015, twenty-one youths from across the 
nation launched a new federal lawsuit against multiple 
agencies in the Obama administration with control over the 
United States’ fossil fuel policies. The plaintiffs’ complaint in 
Juliana v. U.S. asserts that the federal government continues 
                                               
51. See Katherine Ellison, An Inconvenient Lawsuit: Teenagers Take Global 
Warming to the Courts, THE ATLANTIC (May 9, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2012/05/an-inconvenient-lawsuit-teenagers-take-global-warming-to-
the-courts/256903/. 
52. For example, the trial court in Kansas dismissed the case for “failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.” See Kansas, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, http://our
childrenstrust.org/state/kansas (last visited April 24, 2016); see also Filippone ex rel. 
Filippone v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 829 N.W.2d 589, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) 
(declining to apply the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere because previously the 
Iowa Supreme Court had declined to extend the doctrine to forested areas and public 
alleyways). However, Judge Doyle’s concurring opinion cites statutes expressing the 
“policy of the State of Iowa to protect its natural resource heritage of air, soils, waters, 
and wildlife for the benefit of present and future citizens.” Id. See also Aronow v. State, 
No. A12-0585, 2012 WL 4476642 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012) (declining to extend the 
public trust doctrine to the atmosphere because no court in Minnesota or any other 
jurisdiction had done so, and because it had refused to apply the doctrine to land in a 
previous holding). 
53. See Kain v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. SJC-11961, at 9 (Mass. May 17, 2016), 
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/2016.05.17.MASupCtDecision.pdf 
54. See International Legal Action, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.
org/legal/international (last visited May 12, 2016). 
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to violate the youngest generation’s constitutional rights and 
fails to protect essential natural resources in the public trust 
by promoting the development of fossil fuels.55 It states: 
For over fifty years, the United States of America has 
known that carbon dioxide (“CO2”) pollution from 
burning fossil fuels was causing global warming and 
dangerous climate change, and that continuing to burn 
fossil fuels would destabilize the climate system on 
which present and future generations of our nation 
depend for their wellbeing and survival. . . . Despite this 
knowledge, Defendants continued their policies and 
practices of allowing the exploitation of fossil fuels.56 
The youth plaintiffs gained a strong initial victory in the 
litigation on April 8, 2016 when Magistrate Judge Thomas 
Coffin recommended denial of the government’s and fossil fuel 
interveners’ motions to dismiss in all aspects, finding that both 
the constitutional claims and the federal public trust claim 
could go forward.57 The court stated: “Given the allegations of 
direct or threatened direct harm, albeit shared by most of the 
population or future population, the court should be loath to 
decline standing to persons suffering an alleged concrete injury 
of a constitutional magnitude.”58 At the time of this writing, 
Judge Coffin’s findings were pending review before federal 
district court Judge Ann Aiken. If the case moves forward to 
trial, the federal government’s fossil fuel policies and their 
climate impacts will be subject to broad open scrutiny for the 
first time, prompting the youths’ attorneys to call this the 
                                               
55. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Juliana v. United 
States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Sept. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Juliana Complaint], 
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/YouthAmendedComplaintAgainstUS.pdf. 
An earlier case, Alec L. v. Jackson, was dismissed by the District of Columbia. Alec L. 
v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D. D.C. 2012), aff’g Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 
561 Fed. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014) (finding Clean Air 
Act displaced the public trust claim). 
56. See Juliana Complaint, supra note 55, at 1. 
57. See Order and Findings & Recommendation, Juliana v. U.S., No. 6:15-cv-1517-
TC (D. Or. Apr. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Juliana Order], http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/
default/files/16.04.08.OrderDenyingMTD.pdf. 
58. Id. at 7. For coverage of the case, see James Conca, Federal Court Rules on 
Climate Change In Favor of Today’s Children, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2016), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/04/10/federal-court-rules-on-climate-change-in-favor-
of-todays-children/#273936b06219. See also John Schwartz, In Novel Tactic on Climate 
Change, Citizens Sue Their Governments, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/05/11/science/climate-change-citizen-lawsuits.html?_r=0. 
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“trial of the millennium.”59 
In sum, ATL is a full-scale, coordinated campaign with 
multiple suits pending and others teed up in different forums, 
all connected by a common template of science and law. 
Unprecedented in scope, this campaign calls upon the judicial 
branch to force an eleventh-hour response to the intensifying 
civilizational threat in the narrow window of time remaining. 
In any successful legal campaign, there are path-breaking 
cases that dismantle barriers and pioneer the development of 
new law. Just as Brown v. Board of Education60 marked the 
emergence of a new legal mechanism to confront racial 
inequality, and as Obergefell v. Hodges61 enumerated that 
same-sex marriage is a constitutional right, one recent ATL 
case in Washington State, Foster v. Washington Department of 
Ecology,62 similarly provides principles that forge important 
ground in the climate trust campaign. The next section 
provides background for discussing Foster by explaining the 
public trust doctrine more fully, which provides the foundation 
for the ATL approach. 
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST FRAMEWORK 
The public trust doctrine requires government to hold vital 
natural resources in trust for the public beneficiaries, both 
present and future generations.63 The doctrine presents 
                                               
59. See Coco McPherson, Why Young Americans Are Suing Obama Over Climate 
Change, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/
why-young-americans-are-suing-obama-over-climate-change-20160312. 
60. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
61. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
62. The litigation has produced three orders, referred to in this Article as Foster I, 
Foster II, and Foster III. See Foster v. State Dep’t of Ecology (Foster I), No. 14-2-25295-
1 SEA, at 1–2 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 23, 2015); Foster v. State Dep’t of Ecology 
(Foster II), No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015). For the court’s 
recent disposition as this article goes to press, see Order on Petitioners’ Motion for 
Relief Under CR 60(b), Foster III, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (May 16, 2016). See also Peter 
Andrew Hart, Washington State Kids Score Huge Legal Win in Climate Change 
Lawsuit, HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
washingtonk-kids-climate-lawsuit_us_5723f60ae4b01a5ebde5be52. 
63. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois (Illinois Central), 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) 
(“The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are 
interested . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of 
government and the preservation of the peace.”); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 
525–29 (1896) (detailing ancient and English common law principles of sovereign trust 
ownership of air, water, sea, shores, and wildlife and stating: “[T]he power or control 
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reserved, inalienable property rights held by the public to 
protect crucial resources from monopolization and/or 
destruction by private interests. The doctrine gives force to the 
plain expectation, central to the purpose of organized 
government: that natural resources essential for survival and 
welfare remain abundant, justly distributed, and bequeathed 
to future generations. In a very basic sense, the public trust 
principle governs for the endurance of the nation and its fifty 
states. 
The public trust stands apart from police power as a source 
of authority and duty incumbent on the government.64 As a 
property-based counterweight to government’s discretionary 
police power, the trust secures the people’s rights to a 
sustained natural endowment. This principle has been 
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court many times and manifests 
in a multitude of court decisions, constitutions, and statutes 
from across this country and, indeed, from around the world.65 
American courts routinely recognize the ancient origins of the 
public trust as tracing back to the beginnings of human 
civilization and legal systems. The essential public rights that 
infuse the trust were expressed in Roman times in the 
Institutes of Justinian, which declared: “By the law of nature 
these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, 
the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”66 
The trust is rooted in the original social compact citizens 
make with their governments. Because citizens would never 
confer to their government the power to substantially impair 
resources crucial to their survival and welfare,67 the governing 
                                               
lodged in the State, resulting from this common ownership, is to be exercised, like all 
other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people.”); Ariz. Ctr. for 
Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (“The 
beneficiaries of the public trust are not just present generations but those to come”). 
See also Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 557–66 (1970) (seminal article discussing 
public trust concept). For cases and materials on the public trust doctrine, see 
MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (2d ed. 2015). 
64. See Mary Christina Wood & Dan Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery Litigation: 
Making the Fossil Fuel Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate System, 45 ENVTL. L. 
259, 272 (2015). 
65. See generally BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 63 (compiling cases across the U.S. 
and in nations world-wide). 
66. J. INST., 2.1.1. (T. Sandars trans., 4th ed. 1867). 
67. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452. 
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assumption of the public trust principle is that citizens reserve 
public ownership of crucial resources as a perpetual trust to 
sustain society and the nation. In keeping with the traditional 
trust framework, governments hold natural resources (the res) 
in a trust for present and future generations of citizens (the 
beneficiaries).68 
As the United States Supreme Court held in Geer v. 
Connecticut, “the power or control lodged in the State, 
resulting from this common ownership, is to be exercised, like 
all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the 
people.”69 Such reserved public property rights to crucial 
resources are fundamental to the democratic understandings 
underlying all state and federal government authority in the 
United States.70 Courts have often said that privatization of 
essential resources “would be a grievance which never could be 
long borne by a free people.”71 As Professor Joseph Sax 
famously noted, the public trust demarcates a society of 
“citizens rather than of serfs.”72 
A seminal public trust case, Illinois Central Railroad v. 
Illinois, demonstrates the limits imposed by the public trust on 
government actors. There, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted 
a legislative conveyance of Lake Michigan’s shoreline to a 
private railroad company. The Court found that the state 
legislature had no authority to make such a conveyance, 
because the lands were held in public trust; accordingly, the 
railroad’s title was invalid.73 A contrary rule, the Court noted, 
would “place every harbor in the country at the mercy of a 
majority of the legislature of the state in which the harbor is 
situated.”74 The Court made clear the constitutional trust 
                                               
68. See Hassell, 837 P.2d at 169 (“The beneficiaries of the public trust are not just 
present generations but those to come.”). 
69. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896). 
70. See San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 242 Cal. App. 4th 
202, 232 (2015) (“The public trust doctrine, which is traceable to Roman law, rests on 
several related concepts. First, that the public rights of commerce, navigation, fishery, 
and recreation are so intrinsically important and vital to free citizens that their 
unfettered availability to all is essential in a democratic democracy.”) (quoting Zack’s, 
Inc. v. City of Sausalito, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 1175–76 (2008)). 
71. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1892) (quoting Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J. Law 
1, 78 (1821)). 
72. Sax, supra note 63, at 484. 
73. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453–56. 
74. Id. at 455. 
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restraint upon legislatures: 
The legislature could not give away nor sell the 
discretion of its successors in respect to matters, the 
government of which, from the very nature of things, 
must vary with varying circumstances. The legislation, 
which may be needed one day for the harbor, may be 
different from the legislation that may be required at 
another day. Every legislature must, at the time of its 
existence, exercise the power of the State in the 
execution of the trust devolved upon it.75 
The public trust is characteristically explained as an 
attribute of sovereignty that government cannot shed.76 As the 
Court declared in Illinois Central, “[t]he state can no more 
abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are 
interested,” than “it can abdicate its police powers in the 
administration of government.”77 One federal district court 
noted: “The trust is of such a nature that it can be held only by 
the sovereign, and can only be destroyed by the destruction of 
the sovereign.”78 
Modern scholars and judges increasingly recognize the 
constitutional force of the public trust doctrine.79 Professor 
Gerald Torres describes the trust as the slate upon which “all 
constitutions and laws are written.”80 In the landmark opinion 
                                               
75. Id. at 460. 
76. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527 (1896) (describing the sovereign 
trust over wildlife resources as an “attribute of government”); In re Water Use Permit 
Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 443 (Haw. 2000) (“history and precedent have established the 
public trust as an inherent attribute of sovereign authority.”). See also Karl S. Coplan, 
Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes: A Sustainable Middle 
Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 287, 311 (2010) (“The idea that public trust limits 
and powers inhere in the very nature of sovereignty is one consistent thread in public 
trust cases. . . . Public trust principles have been described as an essential attribute of 
sovereignty across cultures and across millennia.”). 
77. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
78. United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981). 
79. See Douglas L. Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine: Lessons from 
Illinois Central Railroad, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 879–80 (2001) (explaining 
constitutional reserved powers doctrine as reflection of the public trust principle). For 
further discussion, see Gerald Torres & Nate Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s 
DNA, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281 (2014). 
80. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 48, at 126 (quoting Torres & Bellinger, 
supra note 79). See also Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 (S.C., July 30, 1993) 
(Phil.), as reprinted in JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 441–44 
(Thompson West 2006) (The “right to a balanced and healthful ecology . . . may even be 
said to predate all governments and constitutions. . . . [T]hese basic rights need not 
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Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania, a plurality of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court described the trust as embodying 
the “inherent and indefeasible” rights of citizens reserved 
though their social contract with government.81 While the 
Pennsylvania Constitution contains a specific amendment 
setting forth the public trust,82 the Robinson opinion makes 
clear that the enactment of Article 1, Section 27 did not create 
new rights, but rather enumerated the pre-existing rights that 
the people had reserved for themselves in creating the 
government.83 Similarly, courts in Wisconsin, Louisiana, 
Alaska, Arizona, and Hawaii have also recognized the 
constitutional underpinnings of the public trust doctrine, often 
interpreting the principle in conjunction with specific 
constitutional provisions.84 
Most recently, the ATL case, Juliana v. U.S., found a federal 
constitutional public trust duty embodied in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating: “The doctrine is 
deeply rooted in our nation’s history and indeed predates it.”85 
The federal government defendants and industry interveners 
took the position that there is no constitutional public trust bar 
                                               
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of 
mankind.”).  
81. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 948 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion). 
The court described such rights as “of such ‘general, great and essential’ quality as to 
be ensconced as ‘inviolate.’” Id. at 947. 
82. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (added by amendment in 1971). 
83. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 948 (“Among the inherent rights of the people of 
Pennsylvania are those enumerated in Section 27.”); id. at 1016 n.36 (“’[T]he concept 
that certain rights are inherent to mankind, and thus are secured rather than 
bestowed by the Constitution, has a long pedigree in Pennsylvania that goes back at 
least to the founding of the Republic.’”) (quoting Driscoll v. Corbett, 69 A.3d 197, 208 
(Pa. 2013)); see also OR. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“Natural rights inherent in people. We 
declare that all men, when they form a social compact are equal in right: that all power 
is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and 
instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness.”). 
84. State v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492, 497 (Wis. 1983) (grounding the public trust 
doctrine in the state constitution); Save Ourselves v. State Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 
So.2d 1152, 1154 (La. 1984) (recognizing a public trust based on the state constitution); 
Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 493–96 (Alaska 1988) 
(holding that the constitutional “common use” clause adopted common law trust 
principles in relation to fish, wildlife, and water resources); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the 
Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (interpreting public trust 
and the gift clause of the state constitution); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.
3d 409, 443–44 (Haw. 2000) (holding that the public trust doctrine was “a fundamental 
principle of constitutional law in Hawaii”). 
85. See Juliana Order, supra note 57, at 20. 
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preventing Congress from alienating the territorial waters of 
the U.S. to private corporations. The magistrate judge said: 
“Nor can I imagine that our coastal sea waters could possibly 
be privatized without implicating principles that reflect core 
values of our Constitution and the very essence of the purpose 
of our nation’s government.”86 
Abroad, the public trust finds expression in many nations’ 
constitutions.87 The Philippines Supreme Court described the 
public trust’s primordial constitutional force in Oposa v. 
Factoran when it halted logging of the country’s last remaining 
ancient forest. The Oposa court declared: 
[E]very generation has a responsibility to the next to 
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full 
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. . . . 
[This] belongs to a different category of rights [than 
civil and political rights] altogether for it concerns 
nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation . . . the advancement of which may even be 
said to predate all governments and constitutions. 
. . . . 
[T]hese basic rights need not even be written in the 
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the 
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly 
mentioned[,] . . . it is because of the well-founded fear of 
its framers that unless [these rights] are mandated as 
state policies by the Constitution itself . . . the day 
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only 
for the present generation, but also for those to come—
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched 
earth incapable of sustaining life.88 
Natural commonwealth sustains a nation. The public trust 
principle aims to protect resources that are vital for 
sovereignty, survival, and human welfare, so as promote the 
endurance of society as it unfolds into future generations. 
Thus, the trust imposes strict fiduciary obligations on trustees 
to protect the assets that they hold in trust for the people.89 A 
                                               
86. Id. at 23. 
87. See BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 63, at 305–332.  
88. See also Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 (S.C., July 30, 1993) (Phil.), as 
reprinted in JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 441–44 (Thompson West 
2006) (emphasis added). 
89. For a discussion of fiduciary duties, see Section III.B.2, infra, and accompanying 
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key question in public trust jurisprudence concerns the scope 
of the protected assets, or the res. ATL asserts that air is part 
of the class of resources protected in trust. 
As a starting point, the trust res consists of natural assets 
recognized to serve the trust’s purpose. When defining the 
scope of the trust res, courts have always looked to the needs of 
the public. This analytical framework originates with Illinois 
Central’s seminal characterization of public trust assets as “a 
subject of public concern to the whole people of the state.”90 
Noting that the trust arises “necessarily from the public 
character of the property,” the Court held that such trust 
assets “cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction and 
control of the state.”91 As Professor Charles Wilkinson 
explains, “[t]he public trust doctrine is rooted in the precept 
that some resources are so central to the well-being of the 
community that they must be protected by distinctive, judge-
made principles.”92 Guided by such principles, courts have 
greatly expanded the scope of public trust property over time. 
The original cases dealt primarily with navigable waters, 
fisheries, and wildlife, because those resources played a vital 
role in the dominant nineteenth-century pursuits of fishing, 
navigation, and commerce. But the “public concern” test 
announced in Illinois Central naturally led courts to expand 
the res to keep pace with scientific knowledge and modern 
concerns. As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed: “[W]e 
perceive the public trust doctrine not to be ‘fixed or static,’ but 
one to ‘be molded and extended to meet changing conditions 
and needs of the public it was created to benefit.’”93 The 
Supreme Court of Hawaii similarly stated that “the ‘purposes’ 
or ‘uses’ of the public trust have evolved with changing public 
values and needs.”94 Various courts now recognize modern 
                                               
text. 
90. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892) (emphasis added). See also WOOD, 
NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 48, at 146–61 (for a broader discussion of the evolution of 
the “public concern” precedent). 
91. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 454–56. 
92. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 269, 315 (1980). 
93. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984). 
94. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 448 (Haw. 2000). See also 
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (“In administering the trust the state 
is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over 
another.”). 
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concerns such as biodiversity, wildlife habitat, aesthetics, and 
recreation as purposes of the trust.95 Correspondingly, courts 
have applied the trust doctrine well beyond its traditional 
scope to assets such as groundwater, wetlands, dry sand 
beaches, parks, non-navigable waterways, and most recently, 
air and atmosphere.96 
As courts advance their understanding of ecology, some are 
inclined to expand the trust res to reflect the reality of 
inextricably connected resources. The Supreme Court of 
Hawaii, for example, held that groundwater must be 
considered part of the trust res because of its inseparability 
from surface water: “Modern science and technology have 
discredited the surface-ground dichotomy. . . . We confirm that 
the public trust doctrine applies to all water resources, 
unlimited by surface ground distinction.”97 In a similar vein, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Robinson opinion 
emphasized the public’s interest in habitable communities and 
recognized a full gamut of natural resources in the trust res, 
including “resources that implicate the public interest, such as 
ambient air, surface and ground water, wild flora and fauna 
(including fish) that are outside the scope of purely private 
property.”98 
                                               
95. See, e.g., Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (wildlife habitat and recreation); Mineral Cnty. 
v. State Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res., 20 P.3d 800, 808 (Nev. 2001) (aesthetics); 
Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015) (climate 
stability); San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 242 Cal. App. 4th 
202, 233 (2015) (“[A]n increasingly important public use is the preservation of trust 
lands ‘in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific 
study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds 
and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.’”). 
96. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982) (groundwater); Matthews, 
471 A.2d at 358 (dry sand area); Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2015) (appeal pending) (dry sand beach); Big Sur Properties v. Mott, 132 Cal. 
Rptr. 835, 837 (Ct. App. 1976) (park); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine 
Cnty., 658 P.2 709, 719–22 (Cal. 1983) (non-navigable tributaries); Just v. Marinette 
Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 768–69 (Wis. 1972) (wetlands); Esplanade Props., LLC v. City 
of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985–86 (9th Cir. 2002) (wetlands); Owsichek v. State Guide 
Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 495–96 (Alaska 1988) (fish, wildlife, and 
water). 
97. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 447. See also id. at 457 (the trust 
demands “the maintenance of ecological balance.”). 
98. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 955 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion). 
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III. THE THREE STAGES OF ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 
LITIGATION 
Against this backdrop, Atmospheric Trust Litigation seeks 
to apply the fundamental public trust duty of protection to the 
atmosphere to abate continued damage from GHG pollution 
and restore climate balance. Not unlike other coordinated 
litigation campaigns, ATL must progress through three stages 
to prove effective. First, the courts must recognize the 
paramount judicial role in upholding the rights of the 
plaintiffs. Second, the courts must issue declarations of 
principle that will guide government actors and provide a 
framework for the remedy. Third, the courts must manage the 
remedy so that it offers a practical means to enforce the rights 
of the plaintiffs. Unlike other campaigns, however, the urgency 
attending ATL is unprecedented given the climate tipping 
points described at the outset of this Article. The courts must 
move swiftly through these stages, and ultimately in 
coordinated fashion, to force the political branches of 
government to carry out the GHG reduction necessary to 
salvage a habitable planet before those irrevocable thresholds 
are passed. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s famous admonition 
applies with haunting implications to such climate cases: 
“There is such a thing as being too late.”99 The Foster v. 
Department of Ecology case, as discussed in Section III, proves 
groundbreaking for all three stages of atmospheric trust 
litigation. The discussion below elaborates on these three 
stages and surveys the ATL landscape prior to the Foster 
decision. 
A. Stage 1: Recognizing the Judicial Role 
The cornerstone of any trust lies in judicial enforcement. If 
fiduciary obligations become unenforceable in court, a trustee 
can exert untrammeled power over the beneficiaries’ property 
and use that power to advance his or her own singular 
interests. Judge Learned Hand once stated that courts must 
have the ability to enforce fiduciary obligations, or what 
claimed to be a trust would amount to no more than a 
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“precatory admonition.”100 In the public trust realm, courts 
have recognized that judicial enforcement stands essential to 
the balance of power. In a leading public trust case, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court stated, “The check and balance of judicial 
review provides a level of protection against improvident 
dissipation of an irreplaceable res.”101 
The sheer urgency of climate crisis magnifies this important 
judicial role. Recently, the Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin—a 
sitting senior judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and 
former Chief Judge of that circuit—issued a “wake up call” for 
judges, warning: “The current state of affairs . . . reveals a 
wholesale failure of the legal system to protect humanity from 
the collapse of finite natural resources by the uncontrolled 
pursuit of short-term profits. . . . Whether grounded in Article 
III or state constitutional provisions, the third branch must 
now recognize its obligation to provide a check on government 
exercise of power over the public trust.”102 
A court often signals its willingness to engage a particular 
issue by delivering preliminary rulings on procedural grounds 
raised by the defendants, usually in a motion to dismiss. The 
posture of any climate case is challenging, because a system of 
statutory laws exists to address the problem of harmful 
pollution, and various state and federal administrative actions 
are proceeding within that system. It may be difficult for 
judges to appreciate that they should have a role enforcing a 
                                               
100. See Stix v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 562, 563 (2d Cir. 1945); see also United 
States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983) (noting, in the context of Indian trust 
doctrine, that a “fundamental incident” of the trust relationship is “the right of an 
injured beneficiary to sue the trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the 
trust”). 
101. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 455. See also Lake Mich. 
Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 446 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (“The very 
purpose of the public trust doctrine is to police the legislature’s disposition of public 
lands. If courts were to rubber stamp legislative decisions, as Loyola advocates, the 
doctrine would have no teeth.”); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 
P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (“Just as private trustees are judicially accountable 
to their beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive 
branches are judicially accountable for their dispositions of the public trust.”). Public 
trust enforcement provides a means of limiting the breathtaking power of government. 
As James Madison noted: “In Framing a government which is to be administered by 
men over men the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to 
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 51 (James Madison), avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp. 
102. Hon. Alfred T. Goodwin, A Wake-Up Call for Judges, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 785, 
785–88 (2015). 
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public trust obligation outside of this statutory context. They 
may instead assume that the matter should be left entirely to 
the other branches to address without supervision.103 Such 
judges will usually dismiss the case on grounds of political 
question doctrine, preemption, or displacement—doctrines that 
broadcast confidence in the political branches.104 Indeed, 
several ATL cases have met with this fate in the early stages of 
litigation.105 
Courts are called to their role in ATL cases by 
understanding four aspects of the youths’ claim. First, the 
public trust claim asserts constitutional rights. It remains 
manifestly a court’s duty to enforce constitutional rights 
against the other branches; such rights may not be preempted 
or brushed aside on political question grounds—a realization 
beginning to take hold in the context of ATL cases.106 The court 
in Robinson paved the way for such awareness when it 
declared the public trust to embody a fundamental, inherent, 
inalienable right.107 
Second, the claim involves an urgent and unprecedented 
threat. The normal inclination to leave the matter to political 
and administrative processes holds far less sway in times of 
extreme urgency. In the past, courts have recognized urgency 
                                               
103. Some scholars take this position as well, even in face of legislative paralysis. 
See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 50. 
104. For discussion, see LISA KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME 
COURT SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 39–43, 46, 66 
(N.Y.U. Press 2001). 
105. See, e.g., Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D. D.C. 2012) (dismissing 
ATL federal suit on basis of displacement by Clean Air Act and noting that agencies 
are “better equipped” than courts to address carbon emissions); Chernaik v. Kitzhaber, 
328 P.3d 799 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing lower court’s dismissal that had been 
based on political question doctrine, separation of powers doctrine, sovereign 
immunity, and the court’s perceived lack of authority to grant requested relief.); 
Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088 (Alaska 2014) (finding 
public trust but refusing to grant relief on prudential grounds). 
106. See Juliana Order, supra note 57, at 14 (denying government defendants’ 
political question defense, noting: “The complaint does raise issues of whether 
government action/inaction violates the Constitution and these are issues committed to 
the courts rather than either of the political branches.”); Chernaik, 328 P.3d at 804–08 
(a judicial declaration on the scope of the public trust does not violate separation of 
powers.); Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1097–99  (finding three of plaintiff’s claims not barred by 
political question doctrine, but finding that it was not prudent to address them at the 
time). 
107. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 948 (Pa. 2013) (plurality 
opinion). 
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as justifying a swift judicial relief in the public trust context. 
As the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned in declaring the 
public trust rights to certain dry sand beaches in that state: 
“[T]his State is rapidly approaching a crisis as to the 
availability to the public of its priceless beach areas. The 
situation will not be helped by restrained judicial 
pronouncements. Prompt and decisive action by the Court is 
needed.”108 
It hardly needs stating that the beach recreation crisis, 
which prompted decisive pronouncements by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, pales in comparison to the imminent climate 
crisis already threatening irrevocable planetary tipping points. 
As climate scientist James Hansen declared in an amicus brief 
in one atmospheric trust case, judicial relief “may be the best, 
the last, and, at this late stage, the only real chance to 
preserve a habitable planet for young people and future 
generations.”109 
Third, the ATL claim alleges threatened harm of a 
magnitude that is unprecedented.110 Declarations made by 
leading scientists in ATL cases describe the dire situation 
                                               
108. Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 574 (N.J. 1978). See also Oposa v. 
Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 (S.C., July 30, 1993) (Phil.), as reprinted in JAN G. LAITOS 
ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 441–44 (Thompson West 2006) (finding that logging 
violated public trust and noting that “the day would not be too far when all else would 
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for generations to come—
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining 
life.”). 
109. Hansen, Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 5, at 7. 
110. Until the Foster case, discussed in Section IV, infra, courts handling 
atmospheric trust cases have tended to eschew discussion of the potential harm 
brought on by climate crisis. This judicial silence may reflect confusion over the 
climate threat. For years, the fossil fuel industry has sowed doubt about the climate 
crisis to protect itself from regulation. See NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, 
MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON 
ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING (Bloomsbury Press 2011); CHRIS 
MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 60–62 (Basic Books 2006) (describing the 
emergence of reliable and readily available climate change science in the later 1980s, 
and the fossil fuel industry’s concurrent attempts to cast doubt on that science). A 
thorough investigation conducted by the LA Times and Inside Climate News revealed 
that major fossil fuel corporations understood the harm from their actions decades ago, 
even though they projected uncertainty about it to the public. See Bill McKibben, 
Exxon Knew Everything There Was to Know About Climate Change by the Mid-1980s—
and Denied It, THE NATION (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/exxon-
knew-everything-there-was-to-know-about-climate-change-by-the-mid-1980s-and-
denied-it/. As these revelations spread through the press, they may alert judges to the 
climate exigency and the industry’s role in obfuscating it. 
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faced by the youth plaintiffs and emphasize that the future 
survival of humanity is at stake. In 2011, Dr. James Hansen, 
while writing as head of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space 
Studies, expressed the situation in an amicus science brief 
submitted in an ATL case brought against the U.S. 
government: 
[U]nabated fossil fuel emissions the Earth increasingly 
out of energy balance. Unless action is undertaken 
without further delay[,] . . . Earth’s cli- mate system 
will be pressed toward and past points of no return. . . . 
[D]elay in undertaking sharp reductions in emissions 
will undermine any realistic chance of preserving a 
habitable climate system.111 
The extent, gravity, and continuing nature of climate harm 
give atmospheric trust litigation monumental importance. As 
judges become increasingly aware of the climate threat, they 
are likely to take seriously their role in protecting youth 
against climate disruption—particularly when scientists warn 
the court directly through declarations and amicus briefs that 
continued inaction would seal in future conditions likely 
leading to massive death, destruction, and utter chaos across 
the globe that youth alive today (plaintiffs before the court) 
will face later in their life spans. Moreover, the atmospheric 
trust litigation itself, by providing a venue for such climate 
science through declarations, amicus briefs, and testimony, 
holds tremendous value as a truth-seeking forum amidst a 
crisis that has been overtly manipulated and distorted for the 
public eye by the industry that stands to profit most by 
misinformation.112 
Finally, the ATL claim asserts that the other branches of 
government, left alone, will not react to the crisis in time, and 
with sufficient measures. This is a difficult matter for courts to 
appreciate, because environmental statutory law carries the 
implicit promise that agencies will sufficiently protect the 
resources the public relies upon.113 In several early ATL cases, 
courts presumed that administrative action was enough to 
                                               
111. Hansen, Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 5, at 6. 
112. For a discussion of industry misinformation affecting government’s response to 
public health crises, see ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 110. 
113. For further discussion, see WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 48, at 1–18. 
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protect the air and atmosphere.114 Yet as the climate clock 
ticks down without action and the public grows more nervous 
and aware of agency failures, judges too are likely to question 
the adequacy of administrative measures, particularly when 
the youth plaintiffs point out the longstanding failure in 
concrete terms with reference to climate science. 
In the federal ATL case now pending in the federal district 
court of Oregon, plaintiffs submitted evidence showing that, in 
the late 1980s, members of the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee wrote a letter expressly requesting the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency to prepare a plan to stabilize 
the global climate system and transition the nation away from 
fossil fuels.115 The Committee recognized: “There is a very real 
possibility that man—through ignorance or indifference or 
both—is irreversibly altering the ability of our atmosphere to 
perform basic life support functions.”116 Plaintiffs allege that 
EPA did develop such a plan, but it was never implemented, 
and the government continued to pursue a fossil fuel regime 
fraught with danger.117 Based on this and other evidence of 
delay, the plaintiffs charge that government defendants “have 
acted with deliberate indifference to the peril they knowingly 
created.”118 In his opinion recommending that the youth’s 
claims go forward, Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin 
underscored the aspects above when he wrote: 
The debate about climate change and its impact has 
been before various political bodies for some time now. 
Plaintiffs give this debate justiciability by asserting 
harms that befall or will befall them personally and to a 
greater extent than older segments of society. It may be 
                                               
114. See, e.g., Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1227 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that the Air Quality Control Act passed by the New 
Mexico legislature “established adequate procedures to address and implement any 
regulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere”). 
115. See Juliana Complaint, supra note 55, at paras. 138–39. 
116. Letter from U.S. S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works to Lee Thomas, 
Administrator, EPA (Sept. 12, 1986), https://law.uoregon.edu/images/uploads/entries/
‌SG_Wood_095_KKG_Senators‌_Letter__EPA.pdf. 
117. See Juliana Complaint, supra note 55, at paras. 140, 146 (“In response, in 
December, EPA submitted a report to Congress on ‘Policy Options for Stabilizing 
Global Climate.’ The EPA’s 1990 report concluded: ‘responses to the greenhouse 
problem that are undertaken now will be felt for decades in the future, and lack of 
action now will similarly bequeath climate change to future generations.’”). 
118. Id. at para. 8. 
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that eventually the alleged harms, assuming the 
correctness of plaintiffs’ analysis of the impacts of 
global climate change, will befall all of us. But the 
intractability of the debates before Congress and state 
legislatures and the alleged valuing of short-term 
economic interest despite the cost to human life 
necessitates a need for the courts to evaluate the 
constitutional parameters of the action or inaction 
taken by the government.119 
Unlike much litigation, ATL cases are caught in a whirlwind 
of fast-breaking news regarding climate destabilization. As 
reports stream in from around the world regarding the dangers 
posed by continued GHG emissions, and the continuing failure 
of agencies and legislatures to act, courts that recognize their 
role in protecting the rights of youth will press the case 
forward to a second stage. 
B. Stage 2: Issuing Declarations of Principle 
The second stage of ATL involves declaring government 
climate obligations. These derive from basic principles of public 
trust law that establish fiduciary obligations owed by a trustee 
toward the beneficiaries. Such declarations form the sidewalls 
of obligation that courts use in devising a remedy at the third 
stage of litigation. The necessary declarations in ATL cases, as 
explained further below, concern the character of air or 
atmosphere as a trust asset and the duty of government 
trustees to protect and restore it.120 
Notably, judicial declarations in the climate context will 
likely reverberate far beyond the four walls of the courtroom. 
In light of the magnitude of the planetary threat, a clear 
judicial ruling in an ATL case from one country is likely to 
receive attention by citizens, officials, and courts of other 
countries. When strong rulings in climate cases were rendered 
in Pakistan and the Netherlands in 2015, the rulings attracted 
swift international news attention.121 The public trust holds 
                                               
119. See Juliana Order, supra note 57, at 8. 
120. For purposes of this article, the terms “air” and “atmosphere” are used 
interchangeably. 
121. In the Netherlands, a court found that the Dutch government’s climate action 
was wholly inadequate to meet the scale of the threat, and it ordered the government 
to slash emissions 25% within 5 years. Arthur Neslen, Dutch Government Ordered to 
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unique capacity for extraterritorial influence because the 
principle, deriving from ancient Roman law, has iterations in 
nations throughout the world.122 
1. The Atmosphere as a Public Trust Asset 
In order to hold governments accountable to protect the 
atmosphere and climate system under the public trust, courts 
must first declare the atmosphere a public trust asset. The 
history, principles, and intent of the public trust doctrine 
compel recognition of the atmosphere as one of the crucial 
assets in the public trust. As previously discussed, the seminal 
test from Illinois Central asks whether the resource is “a 
subject of public concern to the whole people of the state.”123 
That the atmosphere qualifies as a resource of “public concern” 
seems indisputable, as it supports the climate system upon 
which all humans rely for survival and well-being. While in the 
late 1800s, at the time of Illinois Central, the natural resources 
subject to greatest monopoly were water-based resources that 
supported fishing, navigation, and commerce, no 
environmental issue today holds greater concern for youth 
than climate disruption induced by unregulated GHG 
emissions into the atmosphere. 
The public property interest in air traces back to Roman 
times, when the Institutes of Justinian recognized that, “‘[b]y 
the law of nature,’ ‘the air, running water, the sea, and 
consequently the shores of the sea,’ [are] ‘common to 
mankind.’”124 This statement of Roman law continues to be 
                                               
Cut Carbon Emissions in Landmark Ruling, THE GUARDIAN (June 24, 2015), http://
www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/24/dutch-government-ordered-cut-
carbon-emissions-landmark-ruling. In Pakistan, the court ordered government to take 
climate action according to timeframes set by the court and said that “the delay and 
lethargy of the State . . . offend[ed] the fundamental rights of the citizens.” Ashgar 
Leghari v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2015) Lahore High Ct. (Pak.), edigest.‌elaw.org/sites/
default/files/pk.leghari.091415.pdf (this opinion remains unreported at the time of this 
publication). 
122. See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust 
Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the 
Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 763 (2012); see also BLUMM & WOOD, supra 
note 63, ch. 10. 
123. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892). The Court also described public 
trust assets as “public property, or property of a special character” which “cannot be 
placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the state.” Id. at 454. 
124. See Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 360 (N.J. 1986) (quoting 
THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN § 2.1.1 (533) (T. Sandars trans., 1st Am. ed. 1876)) 
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cited as the foundation of the public trust doctrine in modern 
cases.125 In Geer v. Connecticut, the U.S. Supreme Court relied 
on ancient Roman law’s classification of “res communes” to find 
the public trust doctrine applicable to wildlife.126 Air forms an 
indisputable part of res communes. The U.S. Supreme Court in 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. declared a public property 
interest in air when it said that “the state has an interest 
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the 
earth and air within its domain.”127 
Against this context, courts in several atmospheric trust 
cases have already either expressly or presumably recognized 
air or atmosphere as a public trust asset.128 In Texas, the 
district court found that all natural resources were protected 
under the public trust doctrine and the state’s constitution.129 
The Arizona Court of Appeals stated: “[W]e assume without 
deciding that the atmosphere is a part of the public trust 
subject to the doctrine.”130 The Alaska Supreme Court held 
that the youth “make a good case” that “the atmosphere is an 
asset of the public trust, with the State as trustee and the 
public as beneficiaries.”131 The New Mexico Court of Appeals 
                                               
(noting Roman law as the “genesis” of the public trust doctrine). 
125. See id.; see also United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 122 (D. 
Mass. 1981); San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 242 Cal. App. 4th 
202, 232 (2015). 
126. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523–25 (1896). 
127. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (emphasis added) 
(upholding action by State of Georgia against Tennessee copper companies for trans-
boundary air pollution). 
128. See, e.g., Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1226–
27 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015); Bosner-Lain v. State Comm’n. on Envtl. Quality, Cause No. 
D-1-GN-11-002194 (Texas Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 2012) (overturned on procedural grounds); 
Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, 2013 WL 1091209, *6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013) 
(dismissal affirmed for lack of remedy). See also Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State Dep’t of 
Nat. Res., 355 P.3d 1088, 1101–02 (Alaska 2014) (upheld dismissal on prudential 
grounds); but see Chernaik ex rel. Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273 (Or. Cir. Ct. 
May 11, 2015) (holding that the State has no trust responsibility to preserve the 
atmosphere for future generations) (appeal pending). 
129. See Bosner-Lain, Cause No. D-1-GN-11-002194, at 1. The Texas Court of 
Appeals subsequently held that the legislature had not extended to state courts the 
right to hear cases involving the denial of rulemaking petitions by the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality. See Comm’n. on Envtl. Quality v. Bosner-Lain, 
No. 03-12-0555-CV, 9–12 (Tex. App. Ct. July 23, 2014), http://cases.justia.com/texas/
third-court-of-appeals/2014-03-12-00555-cv.pdf?ts=1406110510. 
130. Butler, 2013 WL 1091209 at *6 (but affirming the trial court’s dismissal). 
131. See Kanuk, 355 P.3d at 1101–02 (but refusing to order the relief sought by the 
plaintiffs on prudential grounds). 
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stated, “[O]ur state constitution recognizes that a public trust 
duty exists for the protection of New Mexico’s natural 
resources, including the atmosphere, for the benefit of the 
people of this state.”132 While two ATL decisions have found no 
public trust responsibility towards air on the basis that cases 
historically applied the public trust to navigable waters and 
their streambeds,133 the appeals decisions in Texas, Alaska, 
Arizona, and New Mexico reflect growing judicial acceptance of 
the atmosphere as part of the public trust. 
2. The Fiduciary Obligations 
Scores of courts have recognized that the sine qua non of the 
public trust is the sovereign’s fiduciary duty to protect the 
public’s crucial assets from irrevocable damage.134 Two active 
duties provide the contours of an atmospheric trust case and 
form the basis for a declaratory judgment against government 
trustees: (1) the duty to protect the asset against “substantial 
impairment,”135 and (2) the duty to restore the asset that has 
been damaged.136 Courts in atmospheric trust cases should 
                                               
132. Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1225 (but affirming the district court’s granting of 
summary judgment to the defendants because the State’s public trust responsibility 
was met pursuant to the Air Quality and Control Act.). 
133. See Filippone ex rel. Filippone v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 829 N.W.2d 589 
(Table) (Iowa Ct. App. 2013); but see id. (J. Doyle, concurring) (noting that public trust 
over air seems “clear as a crisp, cloudless, autumn Iowa ski”); Chernaik ex rel. 
Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273 (Or. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2015). The Oregon Chernaik 
case is on appeal before the Oregon Court of Appeals. Law professors from across the 
nation have submitted an amicus scholars brief contending that the case was wrongly 
decided and that the public trust extends to air. See Michael C. Blumm, Mary C. Wood 
& Steven M. Thiel, The Oregon Public Trust Doctrine and Atmospheric Greenhouse 
Gas Pollution: A Law Professors’ Amicus Brief (Feb. 1, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2720012. 
134. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896) (“[I]t is the duty of the 
legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve the subject of the trust, and secure 
its beneficial use in the future to the people of the state.”); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. 
Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) (describing the public trust as 
“an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage of 
streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands”); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.
3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000) (“Just as private trustees are judicially accountable to their 
beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive branches are 
judicially accountable for the dispositions for the public trust.”). 
135. See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 451–53 (“substantial 
impairment” standard); San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 242 
Cal. App. 4th 202, 237, 239 (2015) (same).  
136. For discussion of the public trust restoration duty see Wood & Galpern, supra 
note 64, at 132–33. For discussion of the parallel duty in the private trust context, see 
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make clear that these public trust duties stand separate and 
apart from statutory and regulatory duties devised by 
legislatures and agencies.137 This is an important dimension of 
an ATL declaration because typically there is an existing 
regulatory scheme that portends to force GHG reduction, but 
such schemes are often merely aspirational, outdated, not 
based on science, or not implemented.138 Courts should 
emphasize that the public trust forms the yardstick against 
which such statutes and regulations are to be measured. As 
the Idaho Supreme Court made clear in Kootenai 
Environmental Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., “[M]ere 
compliance by [agencies] with their legislative authority is not 
sufficient to determine if their actions comport with the 
requirements of the public trust doctrine. The public trust 
doctrine at all times forms the outer boundaries of permissible 
government action with respect to public resources.”139 
Moreover, to be at all effective in forcing climate action, ATL 
declarations should emphasize the active nature of the 
                                               
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205(a), (c) (1959). The restoration duty is also 
expressed in environmental statutes. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 
1531 et seq.; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.; Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Cleanup, Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.; Resource 
Conservation Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. 
137. See, e.g., Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 837 (S.D. 2004) (“The doctrine exists 
independent of any statute.”); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728 n. 27 (“Aside from 
the possibility that statutory protections can be repealed, the noncodified public trust 
doctrine remains important both to confirm the state’s sovereign supervision and to 
require consideration of public trust uses in cases filed directly in the courts.”); 
Kootenai Envtl. All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1095 (Idaho 
1983) (compliance with legislative authority alone is not sufficient to determine to 
determine public trust compliance). 
138. See Donald Brown, Visualizing Why US National and US State Governments’ 
GHG Reductions Commitments Are Woefully Inadequate in Light of Recent Science, 
WIDENER LAW: ETHICS AND CLIMATE (Jan. 26, 2014, 8:09 PM), http://blogs.law.
widener.edu/climate/2014/01/26/visuallizing-why-us-national-and-us-state-
governments-ghg-reductions-commitments-are-now-woefully-inadequate-in-light-of-
recent-science/. See also Juliana Complaint, supra note 55, at para. 8; Section IV.A, 
infra. 
139. Kootenai Envtl. All., 671 P.2d at 1095. The principle flows from the nature of 
the public trust as a constitutional requirement. As such, the public trust doctrine 
cannot be solely defined, nor overcome, by statutory law. The plurality opinion in 
Robinson, for example, found the extensive fracking legislation passed by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalid under the public trust, falling “considerably short 
of meeting [the] obligation” to prevent degradation of public natural resources. The 
plurality concluded: “In constitutional terms, the Act degrades the corpus of the trust.” 
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 979–80 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion). 
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fiduciary duty to protect and restore. As the Robinson plurality 
opinion emphasized in the context of threats posed by fracking, 
the duty of protection is active, not passive (the legislature 
must “act affirmatively to protect the environment, via 
legislative action”), and it applies to both direct and indirect 
action: 
As trustee, the Commonwealth has a duty to refrain 
from permitting or encouraging the degradation, 
diminution, or depletion of public natural resources, 
whether such degradation, diminution, or depletion 
would occur through direct state action or indirectly, 
e.g., because of the state’s failure to restrain the actions 
of private parties.140 
A few atmospheric trust cases so far have propounded a 
general duty of protection.141 But in the context of climate 
action, the duty of protection and the duty of restoration must 
be quantified in terms of carbon emissions reduction to have 
any practical effect. As noted in Section I.B., youth plaintiffs in 
atmospheric trust cases seek judicial orders requiring 
governments to develop climate recovery plans that reduce 
emissions within their jurisdictions in accordance with the best 
available science.142 Such specific targets form the sidewalls of 
the atmospheric trust remedy.143 
                                               
140. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 958. While Chief Justice Castille interpreted the 
Environmental Rights Amendment of that state’s constitution (which states, “As 
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for 
the benefit of all the people”), he acknowledged that the language contained only 
“generalized terms.” His detailed analysis of fiduciary obligation, unspecified by the 
generalized terms, thus proves instructive for cases arising in other states. Id. at 913. 
See also San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 242 Cal. App. 4th 202, 
233–34 (2015) (The state trustee has “an affirmative duty to take the public trust into 
account in the planning and allocation of [trust] resources, and to protect public trust 
uses whenever feasible.”). 
141. See, e.g., Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2015); see also infra Section IV (discussing Foster decision); Bosner-Lain v. 
State Comm’n. on Envtl. Quality, Cause No. D-1-GN-11-002194 (Texas Dist. Ct. Aug. 
2, 2012). 
142. For a discussion of the Hansen team’s prescription, see Part I.A. above. 
143. Some judges may feel that setting a specific trajectory of emissions reduction as 
a legal obligation presents an impossible task. But courts dealing with other 
fundamental rights recognize that their broad power of equity gives generous latitude 
for estimation, approximation, and adjustment. For example, in a case involving 
overcrowding of California prisons, a three-judge panel from the Ninth Circuit 
candidly admitted that choosing the appropriate prison population reduction is “not an 
exact science.” Ultimately the panel decided that permissible prison populations could 
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C. Stage 3: Managing the Remedy 
The third stage of ATL involves managing the remedy 
within the narrow time remaining in view of looming climate 
tipping points.144 Courts in atmospheric trust cases are called 
upon in the same manner as they always have been in public 
trust cases: not to exercise direct management over the res of 
the trust, but to ensure that the political branches fulfill their 
trust obligation to avoid destruction or substantial impairment 
to public assets that are needed to sustain future generations. 
But the sheer urgency of the climate crisis sets ATL apart from 
other public trust cases and calls for more intense judicial 
supervision. In the emerging tipping-point world, effective 
relief depends on close oversight of climate recovery plans to 
ensure their implementation according to strict time frames. 
Climate trust cases have their genesis in long-standing and 
severe neglect of duty by agencies. Facing deep institutional 
entrenchment, judicial remands back to agencies may yield no 
progress and waste considerable time as the climate window of 
opportunity continues to close. Judges have the power to use 
innovative tools to steer agencies back on course, similar to 
strategies a bankruptcy judge might devise in asserting control 
over a terribly managed company. Many tools, such as the use 
of special masters, exist to enable judges to require 
performance and accountability by government defendants.145 
Any judicial action-forcing remedy involves two tasks: 
requiring a plan of measureable steps and providing continued 
oversight to ensure its proper execution. Courts have assumed 
this role many times in the past when faced with severe 
breakdown of agency performance. “Institutional litigation” 
involves close supervision by courts over administrative 
processes, an approach taken in cases involving desegregation, 
treaty rights, land use, prison reform, and educational 
                                               
not exceed 137.5 percent of the design capacity of the prison structure. See Coleman v. 
Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 965, 1003–04 (E.D & N.D. Cal. 2009). 
144. The Magistrate Judge’s Order in Juliana v. U.S. recognized that a judicial 
remedy forcing the Agency to protect the constitutional rights of plaintiffs does not 
exceed the court’s appropriate role, and that the court could force an agency to craft 
regulations. See Juliana Order, supra note 57, at 13–14. 
145. For commentary, see Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of 
Special Masters: Administrative Agencies for the Courts, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 235, 
237 (1997) (remedy in complex litigation “is often prospective and affects large 
numbers of people as would a regulation or legislative rule”). 
35
Wood and Woodward: Atmospheric Trust Litigation and the Constitutional Right to a He
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2016
668 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:2 
 
funding.146 Such cases characteristically exemplify judicial 
vigor and innovation in addressing bureaucratic delinquency. 
“Structural injunctions” emerging from such litigation can aim 
prospectively, sweep broadly, and respond to a myriad of 
scientific and management challenges.147 Such injunctions may 
require continued jurisdiction over a case for decades. But so 
far, no atmospheric trust case has reached this “structural 
injunction” stage of remedial relief. In light of the narrow 
window of time remaining for climate action, judges should 
incorporate strict time frames into a judicial remedy for 
atmospheric trust litigation.148 
IV. FOSTER V. WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF 
ECOLOGY: A PATH-BREAKER FOR ATMOSPHERIC 
TRUST LITIGATION 
A. Procedural History 
In June 2014, eight youth plaintiffs in Washington 
petitioned the State’s Department of Ecology (DOE) to adopt a 
proposed rule that would recommend to the legislature science-
based greenhouse gas emissions limits to stem global 
warming.149 In August 2014, DOE denied the petition without 
challenging the underlying science, stating that the Agency 
would continue its “current approach.”150 The youths appealed 
the decision to the King County Superior Court in September, 
2014 on the basis that the public trust requires protection of 
the climate system and essential resources.151 Just three 
months later, in December 2014, as the case was pending in 
                                               
146. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 48, ch. 11. 
147. See Farrell, supra note 145, at 237. 
148. Courts have acted with haste before in face of unprecedented urgency. See, e.g., 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (determining the U.S. presidential election). 
149. See Foster v. State Dep’t of Ecology (Foster I), No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 1–2 
(Wash. Super. Ct. June 23, 2015). 
150. Id. at 2. The Director stated: “I appreciate the concern and desire of the youth 
petitioners to reduce GHG emissions for improving the environment for themselves 
and future generations. However, Ecology denies your petition for rulemaking in favor 
of its current approach.” Legal Updates: August 19, 2014, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST 
(2015), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/state/washington. 
151. See Petition for Review at 7–13, filed in Foster I, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2014), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/WA.
PetitionForReview.pdf. 
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court, the DOE issued a report to the legislature underscoring 
the sheer urgency of climate action. The report stated: 
Climate change is not a far off risk. It is happening now 
globally and the impacts are worse than previously 
predicted, and are forecast to worsen. . . . If we delay 
action by even a few years, the rate of reduction needed 
to stabilize the global climate would be beyond anything 
achieved historically and would be more costly.152 
On June 23, 2015, Judge Hollis Hill issued an opinion in 
Foster v. DOE that amounted to a significant victory for the 
youth plaintiffs. Characterizing the “Imminent Threat of 
Global Warming,” the opinion quoted extensively from the 
December 2014 report to describe both the urgency of climate 
change and its projected damage, which includes sea level rise, 
ocean acidification, glacier and snowpack loss, floods, droughts, 
wildfires, landslides, and coastal and storm damage.153 The 
court wrote, “Despite this urgent call to action, based on 
science it does not dispute, Ecology’s recommendation in this 
report is, ‘that no changes be made to the state’s statutory 
emission limits at this time.’” Based on both the December 
2014 report and a declaration by climate scientist Dr. Pushker 
Kharecha that the plaintiffs submitted in their opening brief to 
the court, Judge Hill ordered DOE to reconsider its denial of 
the youth plaintiffs’ petition.154 Holding the agency defendant 
to a tight time frame, Judge Hill ordered DOE to report back to 
the court within two weeks (by July 8, 2015) with its decision 
on reconsideration.155 
In July, while the DOE was reviewing the petition anew, the 
plaintiffs leveraged the favorable ruling in Foster v. DOE to 
plead their case to Washington Governor Jay Inslee. Just 
eleven days after his meeting with the youths, the Governor 
issued a directive ordering the DOE to initiate new GHG notice 
                                               
152. See Foster I, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 2 (quoting Dep’t of Ecology, Washington 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Limits, Prepared Under RCW 70.235.040 (Dec. 
2014) [hereinafter December 2014 Report]). 
153. Id. at 2–3 (quoting December 2014 Report). 
154. Id. at 4. Dr. Kharecha is a co-author of the prescription issued by the 
international team of scientists assembled by Dr. Hansen. The court denied the State’s 
motion to strike these two pieces of new evidence (both produced after the State’s 
decision denying youth’s petition), finding “that this new evidence relates to the 
validity of the agency action at the time it was taken.” Id. 
155. See id. at 1–4. 
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and comment rulemaking.156 The move toward new air quality 
regulation effectively granted the procedural relief that the 
Foster plaintiffs sought. In his directive, Governor Inslee 
wrote, “Washington must do more to meet its obligation to 
reduce emissions of carbon pollution. We need to act 
purposefully and swiftly to reduce the threats posed by climate 
change to the health, safety, and economic prosperity of 
Washingtonians.”157 
In August 2015, the DOE notified the court that it had again 
denied the youths’ petition because Governor Inslee’s directive 
had initiated the rulemaking as plaintiffs were requesting.158 
The youth plaintiffs nevertheless appealed the denial to 
superior court, seeking a ruling to declare that their public 
trust rights include the right to a stable atmosphere. The 
youths also sought a declaration that the new GHG rule should 
be based on science. As part of this appeal, the plaintiffs 
submitted a declaration by Dr. James Hansen underscoring 
the climate emergency.  
On November 19, 2015, Judge Hill issued her second opinion 
in Foster v. DOE . Because the rulemaking process sought by 
the youths had already commenced following the Governor’s 
directive, the court upheld DOE’s denial.159 The court could 
have ended the matter there—because relief initially sought by 
the youths was already underway—but instead, Judge Hill 
proceeded to declare strong parameters defining the State’s 
duty to protect the atmosphere under the public trust doctrine. 
These declarations, discussed below, form a ground-breaking 
development in efforts to establish a constitutional climate 
trust responsibility. The strength of these pioneering principles 
notwithstanding, Judge Hill dismissed the case in view of 
DOE’s commenced rulemaking. Understandably, it seemed 
that the plaintiffs had already received that portion of the 
                                               
156. See In Advance of Paris Climate Talks, Washington Court Recognizes 
Constitutional and Public Trust Rights and Announces Agency’s Legal Duty to Protect 
Atmosphere for Present and Future Generations, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST (Nov. 19, 
2015), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/15.11.20WADecisionPR.pdf. 
157. See Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015) 
(quoting Letter from Governor Jay Inslee to Maia Bellon, Dir. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology 
(August 13, 2015)). 
158. Id. at 4. 
159. Id. at 10 (“[T]he petition for review is DENIED due to the Department of 
Ecology having commenced the aforementioned rulemaking process as directed by the 
Governor.”). 
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requested remedy outside of court. 
But time proved otherwise. Just three months after the 
dismissal, and free from judicial supervision, DOE dropped its 
rulemaking process. The move provoked the youth plaintiffs to 
respond: “Ecology’s decision . . . has wasted copious amounts of 
time, has betrayed the trust of the youth, and continues to 
violate our constitutional rights.”160 The plaintiffs’ attorneys 
went back to court and filed a Rule 60 Motion for Relief to 
vacate the portion of the earlier decision dismissing their case 
against DOE. Such a motion requires a showing of 
“extraordinary circumstances.”161 The plaintiffs essentially 
asked the court to resume jurisdiction over the case and take it 
into the remedial stage (the third stage described above). 
Judge Hill did just that, and reiterating the undisputed 
threats from climate destruction, she said from the bench: 
This is an extraordinary circumstance that we are 
facing here. . . . The reason I’m doing this is because 
this is an urgent situation. This is not a situation [in 
which] these children can wait. . . . Polar bears can’t 
wait, the people of Bangladesh can’t wait. I don’t have 
jurisdiction over their needs in this matter, but I do 
have jurisdiction in this court, and for that reason I’m 
taking this action.162 
She ordered DOE to follow through and finalize its 
emissions reduction rule by the end of 2016, and to submit 
recommendations to the legislature on science-based 
reductions for the 2017 legislative session.163 Judge Hill also 
directed DOE to consult with the plaintiffs before making the 
recommendations to the legislature.164 
                                               
160. See State of Washington Delays Action on Climate Change—Again: Department 
of Ecology Abandons Proposed Greenhouse Gas Rule, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST (Mar. 2, 
2016), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/16.03.02EcologyRuleWithdrawal.
pdf. 
161. See Order on Petitioner’s Motion for Relief Under CR 60(b) at 1, Foster III, No. 
14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. May 16, 2016). 
162. Transcript of Hearing at 20, Foster III, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. 
May 3, 2016). 
163. See Youths Secure Win in Washington State Climate Lawsuit: Judge Chastises 
State, Rules From Bench Ordering State to Reduce Carbon Emissions, OUR 
CHILDREN’S TRUST (Apr. 29, 2016), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/2016.
04.29WAFinalRulingPR.pdf. 
164. Foster III, at 3. 
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B. Significance 
Two opinions emerged from the Foster litigation prior to the 
latest order from the court that reassumed jurisdiction over 
the DOE. Although succinct, both opinions represent clarifying 
and forceful pronouncements in the burgeoning field of 
atmospheric trust litigation and may well break ground for 
court opinions in pending and future public trust cases in other 
states and nations. Most profoundly, Judge Hill declared an 
atmospheric public trust responsibility of constitutional 
magnitude in a context framed by urgency, severe danger to 
humanity, and agency recalcitrance. 
1. Recognizing Climate Urgency and the Threat to Human 
Survival 
Until the Foster decision, no court had underscored the 
urgency of climate disruption and the magnitude of the threat 
it presents to future generations Judge Hill did not shy away 
from the gravity of the situation. She stated: 
Plaintiffs assert, the Department does not dispute, and 
this court finds, that current scientific evidence 
establishes that rapidly increasing global warming 
causes an unprecedented risk to earth, including land, 
sea, the atmosphere and all living plants and 
creatures. . . . In fact, as Petitioners assert and this 
court finds, their very survival depends upon the will of 
their elders to act now, decisively and unequivocally, to 
stem the tide of global warming by accelerating the 
reduction of emissions of GHG’s before doing so becomes 
first too costly and then too late.165 
In an introductory section of the opinion entitled, “The 
Imminent Threat of Global Warming,” Judge Hill 
characterized the political delay that led to the case, stating: 
[F]rustrated by a historical lack of political will to 
respond adequately to the increasingly urgent and dire 
acceleration of global warming, eight youth petitioners 
[have] submitted a petition for rulemaking . . . [and] 
assert, consistent with the December 2014 report, that 
prompt decisive action by Ecology is necessary to 
                                               
165. See Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 4–5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015) 
(emphasis added). 
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protect from climate change and ocean acidification the 
state’s natural resources and the children who depend 
on them.166 
As observed above, a court’s stance is likely determined not 
only by the urgency and gravity of the threat but also by the 
judge’s perception as to the adequacy of a response from the 
other branches of government, the branches charged with 
protecting the environment. Typically, government defendants 
allege that their regulatory processes suffice to address the 
problem, and often courts defer to those branches even though 
the plaintiffs allege that the climate response by those 
branches remains shockingly insufficient.167 In Foster, the 
court’s approach to interpreting the plaintiff’s public trust 
rights was likely influenced by the laggard response from the 
other branches of government. Judge Hill had to look no 
further than the DOE’s own December 2014 report to find the 
Agency’s response wholly inadequate. She stated: 
The scientific evidence is clear that the current rates of 
reduction mandated by Washington law cannot achieve 
the GHG reductions necessary to protect our 
environment and to ensure the survival of an 
environment in which Petitioners can grow to adulthood 
safely. In fact, in its 2014 report to the legislature the 
Department stated, “Washington’s existing statutory 
limits should be adjusted to better reflect the current 
science. The limits need to be more aggressive in order 
for Washington to do its part to address climate 
risks.”168 
2. Declaring the Atmosphere as a Public Trust Asset 
The Foster opinion clearly announced the atmosphere as a 
public trust asset. While not the first case to recognize an 
atmospheric trust, Judge Hill’s opinion directly renounced a 
                                               
166. Id. at 3. 
167. See, e.g., Appellants Brief at 2–3, Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 
No. 33,110 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2014), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/
NMOpeningBrief.pdf (“Despite reports by [federal and state] agencies . . . acknowledging 
the impacts of climate change in New Mexico that result from human-caused greenhouse 
gas emissions, the State was taking no measures to address the human causes of climate 
change in New Mexico and in fact repealed New Mexico’s existing greenhouse gas 
regulations.”); see also Hansen, Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 5. 
168. Foster II, at 5. 
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traditional argument routinely brought up by government 
attorneys; namely, because the foundational cases in the field 
dealt primarily with navigable waters and their streambeds, 
the public trust is limited to those resources.169 Noting the 
obvious scientific link between navigable waters and 
atmosphere, Judge Hill tersely rejected the State’s argument: 
[Defendant DOE] argues that since the Public Trust 
Doctrine has not been expanded by the courts beyond 
protection of navigable waters it cannot be applied to 
protection of the “atmosphere.” But this misses the 
point since current science makes clear that global 
warming is impacting the acidification of the oceans to 
alarming and dangerous levels, thus endangering the 
bounty of our navigable waters. . . . The navigable 
waters and the atmosphere are intertwined and to argue 
a separation of the two, or to argue that GHG emissions 
do not affect navigable waters is nonsensical.170 
The Foster court is the first to definitively link GHG 
emissions with ocean acidification. The connection suggests the 
viability of an ATL approach to the crisis of ocean acidification: 
after all, the same redress sought for climate disruption 
(climate recovery plans that force carbon dioxide emissions 
reduction) remains necessary to abate the marine damage. The 
Foster court’s approach of looking to science and recognizing 
the reality of ecological connection to define the trust finds 
company in one of the nation’s leading public trust decisions, 
In re Water Use Permit Applications (commonly called the 
Waiahole Ditch decision).171 In that case, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court rejected the State’s argument that the trust protected 
navigable waters but did not extend to ground waters. 
Dismissing any separation between the two, that court stated: 
Modern science and technology have discredited the 
surface-ground dichotomy. Few cases highlight more 
plainly its diminished meaning and utility than the 
present one, involving surface streams depleted by 
ground water diversions and underground aquifers 
                                               
169. See, e.g., Chernaik ex rel. Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273 at 8–12 (Or. Cir. 
Ct. May 11, 2015). 
170. Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015) 
(emphasis added). 
171.  In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P. 3d 409 (Haw. 2000). 
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recharged by surface water applications. In determining 
the scope of the sovereign reservation, therefore, we see 
little sense in adhering to artificial distinctions neither 
recognized by the ancient system nor borne out in the 
present practical realities of this state.172 
3. Declaring the Constitutional Public Trust Duty 
Framing the law against climate urgency, the Foster court 
unequivocally declared a constitutional public trust duty to 
protect the atmosphere and climate system, stating: 
[T]he State has a constitutional obligation to protect the 
public’s interest in natural resources held in trust for 
the common benefit of the people of the State . . . . If 
ever there were a time to recognize through action this 
right to preservation of a healthful and pleasant 
atmosphere, the time is now.173 
Notably, the court grounded the duty in two separate parts 
of the constitution, both of which have applicability to other 
states. 
a. The Constitutional Duty to Protect the Atmosphere as Part 
of the Sovereign Trust Ownership of Submerged Lands 
First, the Foster court found a constitutional public trust 
duty embodied in Article XVII of the Washington Constitution, 
which declares state ownership of the beds and shores of 
navigable waters.174 Recognizing that the atmosphere and 
submerged lands remain inextricably connected, the court held 
that this part of the state constitution also requires the 
                                               
172. Id. at 445. (emphasis added). 
173. Foster II, at 8–9. Framing the right to a healthy atmosphere as a constitutional 
right, the court again underscored the urgency of climate crisis by citing the December 
2014 Washington DOE report that stated: “Climate change is not a far off risk. It is 
happening now globally and the impacts are worse than previously predicted, and are 
forecast to worsen . . . If we delay action by even a few years, the rate of reduction 
needed to stabilize the global climate would be beyond anything achieved historically.” 
Id. at 9 (quoting WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, WASHINGTON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION 
REDUCTION LIMITS (2014)). The court recognized that the climate protection duty is 
also grounded in the Clean Air Act. See id. at 6 (“This mandatory duty must be 
understood in the context not just of the Clean Air Act itself but in recognition of the 
Washington State Constitution and the Public Trust Doctrine.”). 
174. Id. at 7. 
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government to protect the atmosphere.175 Such analysis also 
provides a constitutional approach to ocean acidification, which 
is caused by carbon dioxide emissions. The analysis should 
apply in other states because it is well settled that, as a matter 
of the federal constitutional equal footing doctrine, all states 
own navigable beds and waterways in trust for the people.176 
Scores of cases already make clear that such trust ownership 
imposes a duty of protection on states to protect the 
streambeds and waters.177 The Foster opinion took the duty a 
step further and applied it to atmosphere by recognizing the 
ecological chain of causation between atmospheric GHG 
pollution and the condition of streambeds and waterways.178 
b. The Constitutional Duty to Protect the Atmosphere as Part 
of the Reserved Inalienable Rights Secured by the State 
Constitution 
In a separate section of the opinion, Judge Hill made clear 
DOE’s “responsibility to protect fundamental and inalienable 
rights protected by the Washington State Constitution.”179 
Drawing from Article 1, Section 30, which states that “[t]he 
enumeration of certain rights shall not be construed to deny 
others retained by the people,” the court announced a “right to 
preservation of a healthful and pleasant atmosphere. . . .”180 
While notably succinct, the opinion amounts to an important 
refrain of the landmark Pennsylvania Robinson opinion 
described above, in which Chief Justice Castille declared a 
                                               
175. Id. at 8. 
176. See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222 (1845) (describing the equal footing 
doctrine); PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (holding that the origin 
of equal footing doctrine is the U.S. Constitution); Idaho v. U.S., 533 U.S. 262 (2001) 
(discussing the equal footing doctrine as it applies to navigable waters); United States 
v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926) (same). 
177. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 719–
22 (Cal. 1983) (non-navigable tributaries); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 
409, 445 (Haw. 2000) (all waters); Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838–39 (S.D. 
2004) (all waters); San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 242 Cal. 
App. 4th 202, 232–34 (2015) (submerged lands, tidewaters, and navigable streams); 
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379–80 (Cal. 1971) (tidelands); Just v. Marinette 
Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 768–69 (Wis. 1972) (wetlands); Esplanade Props., LLC v. City 
of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985–86 (9th Cir. 2002) (tidelands). 
178. Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015). 
179. Id. (emphasis added). 
180. Id. at 9. 
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constitutional right to a healthful environment embedded in 
the social contract between citizens and their government.181 
The Foster court described the right as “fundamental and 
inalienable,” and referred to Article 1 of the Washington 
Constitution, which reserves fundamental rights to the 
citizens. The approach parallels the Robinson court’s 
articulation of “inherent and indefeasible” environmental 
rights located in Article 1 of that state’s constitution, which 
preserves the people’s right to clean air and pure water.182 The 
plaintiffs in Foster relied heavily on the Robinson case to 
promote a constitutional understanding of the public trust.183 
The Foster court’s pronouncement of an inherent right to a 
healthy atmosphere should have value in ATL cases brought in 
other states. The same reserved rights of citizens are secured 
in other state constitutions.184 Article I of the Oregon 
Constitution, for example, (like Pennsylvania’s constitution) 
expressly reserves power “inherent in the people.”185 Moreover, 
the pending ATL case against multiple federal agencies in the 
Obama Administration, Juliana v. U.S., relies on both the 
public trust and federal constitutional protections of due 
process and equal protection, all of which are illuminated by 
                                               
181.  Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 947–49 (Pa. 2013) (plurality 
opinion). 
182. See id. (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 provision that all citizens “’have certain 
inherent and indefeasible rights.’”). The Robinson plurality made clear that, while 
Pennsylvania amended its constitution to provide express protection for natural 
resources, the environmental rights held by citizens pre-existed that amendment. See 
supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
183. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, Foster I, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 16, 2015), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/ATL.Opening%20Brief.
Final_.3.16.14.pdf; see also Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for 
Declaratory Relief, Chernaik ex rel. Chernaik v. Brown, No. 161109271 (Or. Cir. Ct. 
Jan. 9, 2015), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/15.01.09.OR_.PlsMotforSJ.
pdf. 
184. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent 
and have inalienable rights.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Rights of Individuals. All 
persons are free by nature and are equal in their inherent and inalienable rights.”); 
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 1 (“Equal Rights. All men are possessed of equal and 
inalienable natural rights. . . .”); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All individuals are by nature 
equally free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are 
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty.”). 
185. Compare OR. CONST. art. I, § 1 with PA. CONST. art I, § 2. See also supra note 83 
(quoting Oregon constitution). For further discussion, see Torres & Bellinger, supra 
note 79.  
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reserved inherent rights analysis.186 The magistrate judge 
recommended that the district court affirm, in the climate 
context, the validity of both separate constitutional rights and 
federal public trust rights embedded in substantive due 
process protections. By presenting a constitutional basis for the 
atmospheric trust duty, plaintiffs can urge courts to fully 
scrutinize agency action taken pursuant to a statute. Under 
this approach, plaintiffs can challenge the underlying statutes 
as constitutionally deficient when they fail to adequately 
address carbon emissions. 
4. The Mandatory and Active Nature of the Public Trust Duty 
The Foster court made clear that the public trust duty of 
protection is both mandatory and active, stating, “[T]he Public 
Trust Doctrine mandates that the State act through its 
designated agency to protect what it holds in trust.”187 
Importantly, Judge Hill did not simply presume that just any 
rule addressing GHG emissions would fulfill that duty. 
Instead, Judge Hill looked further and noted that the existing 
GHG rule was not sufficient to fulfill the public trust duty, 
stating: “[T]he emissions standards currently adopted by 
Ecology do not fulfill the mandate to ‘[p]reserve, protect and 
enhance the air quality for current and future generations.’”188 
She noted that the regulations then in place addressed only a 
portion of the pollution sources, while not addressing 
transportation sources that amount to forty-four percent of the 
total annual state emissions.189 She concluded: “One need only 
go back to Ecology’s pronouncement in the December 2014 
report to appreciate the inadequacy of its current efforts to 
preserve, protect, and enhance the air quality for current and 
                                               
186. See, e.g., Juliana Complaint, supra note 55. In a prior federal atmospheric trust 
case brought by youth plaintiffs against the U.S. government, law professors from 
across the nation submitted an amicus brief explaining the relationship between 
reserved legislative powers, inherent rights of citizens, and the Due Process and Equal 
Protection guarantees of the U.S. Constitution. For the expanded draft version of the 
brief, see John Davidson, Draft Atmospheric Trust Litigation Amicus Brief, SSRN 2–
40 (Nov. 30, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361780. 
187. Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015). 
188. Id. at 6 (citing statutory duty, which the court emphasized “must be 
understood” in the context of the state constitution and public trust doctrine as well). 
189. Id. at 6–7. 
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future generations.”190 
It remains to be seen whether, under the court’s resumed 
jurisdiction, DOE will promulgate a rule that reflects 
scientifically proscribed rates of emissions reduction. If not, the 
youth plaintiffs may ask the court to evaluate the sufficiency of 
the regulation. However, the scrutiny given to DOE’s prior rule 
is worth noting, for it indicates a judicial willingness to 
evaluate the adequacy of a regulation at least in terms of the 
sources it covers. By finding the regulation deficient because it 
failed to address the transportation sector, the court indicated 
its understanding that a macro approach is needed to address 
the problem of GHG reduction across a given jurisdiction. 
Indeed, a major advantage of ATL is its demand for a macro 
analysis of the asset as a whole, which is quite different than a 
traditional statutory approach requiring only incremental 
actions. The ATL suits seek a full climate recovery plan that 
forces GHG emissions reduction on an annual basis according 
to the best available science. The Foster case provides some 
judicial endorsement of such a full-scale approach.191 
Moreover, and equally important, the opinion shows that 
science must be a part of the rulemaking process, although the 
question of how science will be balanced against economic, 
social, and political concerns must wait for another day.192 At 
this stage, the important feature to note is that this court 
allowed plaintiffs to submit declarations from some of the 
leading climate scientists in the world, and the court made 
clear throughout both opinions its respect for scientific 
explanations and the need for science-based action. 
Presumably, the statement in Dr. Jim Hansen’s declaration 
finding the State’s existing statutory GHG reduction 
requirements “scientifically unsupported” had bearing on the 
court’s decision.193 
                                               
190. Id. at 7. 
191. The opinion, however, did not force the State to base its new rulemaking on 
science alone, as asked by the plaintiffs. See infra note 192. 
192. See Foster II, at 9 (“Now that Ecology has commenced rulemaking to establish 
greenhouse emission standards taking into account science as well as economic, social 
and political considerations, it cannot be found to be acting arbitrarily or 
capriciously.”). 
193. See Declaration of Dr. James E. Hansen at 9, Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2015), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/15.08.
25.WAResponseShowCauseOrder-HansenDecl.pdf (noting that scientific reports “are 
centrally relevant to the question now before [the court], namely, whether Ecology is 
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5. A Judicially Supervised Remedy 
Judge Hill’s decision to resume jurisdiction over the Foster 
case (by vacating the earlier order dismissing the case), and 
her imposition of strict time frames for rulemaking, represent 
precisely the time-sensitive and decisive judicial approach 
necessary to spur a necessary government climate response. 
Judge Hill’s statement from the bench—notably: “The kids 
can’t wait”—clearly indicated the court’s sense of urgency.194 
The same sense of urgency was manifest in earlier phases of 
the case. After finding in June, 2015, that the DOE had 
wrongly dismissed the youth’s petition for a rulemaking, the 
court gave the Agency just two weeks in which to conduct its 
reconsideration of the matter and report back to court.195 The 
court also displayed disapproval of the Agency’s prior delay in 
reporting to the legislature on climate (the report was 
submitted in December, 2014, four months after the 
deadline).196 If atmospheric trust litigation is to succeed in 
forcing carbon reduction, judges must require climate recovery 
plans within strict deadlines set by the court. The Foster 
decisions show a strong judicial inclination in that direction. 
Additionally, the halting nature of this lawsuit demonstrates 
well the need for continued jurisdiction. Agencies caught in the 
maelstrom of politics are likely to ignore court-ordered 
remedies, as here, where, upon the court’s dismissal, DOE 
simply dropped the court-ordered rulemaking process. When 
Judge Hill resumed jurisdiction over the case in May 2016, she 
declared from the bench: “I’m not confident at this point that 
the rulemaking procedure will be completed by the end of 2016 
without a court order.”197 
                                               
entitled to slow-dance towards compliance with the scientifically-unsupported 
emissions reductions in RCW 70.235.020 while the planet burns. . . . [F]ossil fuel 
emission phase out must be commenced without further delay. Indeed, much further 
delay can only consign our children and their progeny to a very different, far less 
hospitable, planet.”). 
194. See Youths Secure Win in Washington State Climate Lawsuit: Judge Chastises 
State, Rules From Bench Ordering State to Reduce Carbon Emissions, OUR 
CHILDREN’S TRUST (Apr. 29, 2016), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/2016.
04.29WAFinalRulingPR.pdf. 
195. See Foster I, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 4 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 23, 2015). 
196. See Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015) 
(noting failure of Ecology to meet deadline). 
197. Transcript of Hearing at 20, Foster II. 
48
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss2/14
2016] ATL: JUDICIAL RECOGNITION AT LAST 681 
 
Moreover, by basing the right to a stable atmosphere in the 
state constitution, the Foster case may have forged important 
ground in creating a judicial interface with the legislature at 
the remedy stage, particularly when new legislation may be 
required to produce a state carbon recovery plan. In her last 
ruling, Judge Hill ordered DOE to develop legislative 
recommendations. A high-profile case in Washington State, 
McCleary v. State, provides a striking example of a legislative 
remand and continuing judicial supervision in the context of 
enforcing another constitutional right held by youth—the right 
to a public education.198 In that case, after protracted litigation 
finding that the legislature failed to meet its constitutional 
obligation to fund public education, the Washington Supreme 
Court ordered the legislature to develop a plan with a concrete 
phase-in schedule for funding the various components of public 
education.199 When the legislature failed to arrive at an 
adequate plan, the court unanimously found the State in 
contempt of court, warning that, if the legislature did not take 
actions sufficient to purge the order by the end of the 2015 
legislative session, the court would reconvene and impose 
specific sanctions. Later, after the 2015 legislative session 
concluded, the court unanimously imposed fines of $100,000 
per day on the State of Washington for failing to comply with 
its order. While the court acknowledged “significant progress 
in some key areas” had been made to fund education, it found 
that the State had still not developed a plan to fully fund 
education. The court emphasized that: 
[I]t will not dictate the details of how the State is to 
achieve full funding of basic education[,] . . . [but] in 
accordance with its obligation to enforce the commands 
of the Washington Constitution, and pursuant to its 
continuing jurisdiction over this matter to ensure 
steady progress towards constitutional compliance, the 
court has only required, and still requires, the State to 
present its plan for achieving compliance by its own 
deadline of 2018.200 
                                               
198. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 248 (Wash. 2012). 
199. Order at 8, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.
courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/20140109_843627_
McClearyOrder.pdf. 
200. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). 
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The approach—presumably made accessible to Washington’s 
ATL litigation through Foster’s declaration of a constitutional 
right to a healthy atmosphere—could provide guidance for 
judicial supervision of climate recovery plans in the future. 
While the McCleary decision was rendered for a totally 
different context than climate, the Washington Supreme Court 
illuminated the appropriate role of courts in areas of 
constitutional enforcement that require an active legislative 
response: 
[A]s the court has repeatedly stated, it does not wish to 
dictate the means by which the legislature carries out 
its constitutional responsibility or otherwise directly 
involve itself in the choices and trade-offs that are 
uniquely within the legislature’s purview. Rather, the 
court has fulfilled its constitutional role to determine 
whether the State is violating constitutional commands, 
and having held that it is, the court has issued orders 
within its authority directing the State to remedy its 
violation, deferring to the legislature to determine the 
details. These orders are not advisory or designed only 
to get the legislature’s “attention”; the court expects 
them to be obeyed even though they are directed to a 
coordinate branch of government. When the orders are 
not followed, contempt is the lawful and proper means 
of enforcement in the orderly administration of 
justice.201 
An equally vigorous degree of judicial supervision and 
engagement is warranted in the context of a climate emergency 
brought on by decades of legislative recalcitrance and delay in 
regulating GHG emissions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The atmosphere and oceans remain quintessential public 
trust resources that all governments have a fundamental duty 
to protect. Unprecedented and irrevocable harm hangs in the 
balance of the atmospheric trust litigation cases filed across 
the United States and in other countries. Courts remain both 
well situated and fully obligated to prevent environmental 
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agencies from ignoring the carbon dioxide emissions that 
threaten human life, welfare, and, ultimately, civilization 
itself. 
The window of opportunity to stave off climate tipping points 
has nearly closed. The youth plaintiffs in ATL cases ask judges 
to apply public trust principles as courts have done for over 
two centuries—to protect the natural resources that citizens 
rely on for their survival and well-being. Framed by the sense 
of urgency and the gravity of the youth’s survival interests, the 
Foster decisions advanced the growing field of atmospheric 
trust litigation by making clear a constitutional duty to protect 
the atmosphere. 
If there remains a habitable planet at the end of the century, 
it may well be because extraordinary jurists across the world 
rose to their constitutional role and vindicated the rights of 
young people as beneficiaries of the public trust at a time when 
action could still be taken before climate tipping points 
rendered such efforts moot. Future generations may look back 
to the Foster case as a principled legal turning point in the 
climate battle—and a heroic decision handed down to the ages. 
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